Broken Promise: The Demise of  Sure and Certain Relief  under the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act by Haas, Dean J.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 89 Number 4 Article 2 
1-1-2013 
Broken Promise: The Demise of "Sure and Certain Relief" under 
the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act 
Dean J. Haas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Haas, Dean J. (2013) "Broken Promise: The Demise of "Sure and Certain Relief" under the North Dakota 
Workers Compensation Act," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 89 : No. 4 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol89/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
            
 
BROKEN PROMISE: THE DEMISE OF “SURE AND CERTAIN 
RELIEF” UNDER THE NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION ACT 
DEAN J. HAAS* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The workers’ compensation bargain in which employees gave up the 
ability to sue their employers in exchange for “sure and certain relief” is 
premised on the economic theory that such voluntary agreement between 
competing interests promotes efficiency in an unfettered market.  The cost 
of workers’ compensation, ostensibly borne by employers, is supposedly 
priced into the cost of the product or service.  This is said to “internalize” 
the cost to industry, a bedrock economic principle necessary to ensure 
efficient allocation of resources and employee safety.  Yet, in North Dakota, 
the bargain is broken.  Employee safety has taken a backseat to saving 
employers money.  This is evident in nearly every aspect of workers’ 
compensation in North Dakota.  Medical necessity determinations are 
subject to resolution under a binding dispute resolution mechanism without 
a right to a hearing.  And once disability benefits have been terminated, a 
mistaken decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court precludes 
opportunity for reinstatement in a great number of cases.  In addition, the 
byzantine and restrictive Century Code, conservative rulings of the Court, 
and the adversarial litigation posture of Workforce Safety and Insurance 
have resulted in the near death of the claimants’ bar.  Employees who have 
lost their job and are denied workers compensation benefits are often unable 
to afford to hire an attorney.  Further, Workforce Safety’s vigorous defense 
strategy includes excessive reliance on out-of-state Independent Medical 
Examinations.  And the Agency’s consistent lobbying against any 
legislation that improves benefits or merely levels the playing field 
highlights the degree to which North Dakota has broken its promise of 
relief to injured employees.  Unfortunately, a remedy does not appear 
anywhere on the horizon.  Employees attracted to North Dakota find that if 
they are unfortunate enough to suffer a work injury here, their financial 
health is as devastated as their physical being.  Admittedly, not all physical 
injuries can be prevented.  But human virtue requires North Dakota live up 
to its promise of “sure and certain” relief. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
North Dakota is enjoying national attention from the oil boom. But our 
great state is not just blessed with oil and gas and good agricultural land, 
but also with an industrious, hard-working, and dedicated people.  North 
Dakota has lured workers from every part of the country; they come to earn 
good wages, and they make a valuable contribution to our state’s economy.  
Many of these new jobs are hard labor and carry with them risk of injury.  It 
is increasingly common for an individual hurt at work to return to his or her 
home state if disability persists.  They carry with them stories of pauperism 
resulting from an injury inadequately compensated by North Dakota 
Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”).  As never before, our state’s 
workers compensation system is front and center.  Unfortunately, this 
highlights the failure to live up to the high standard set by the authors of the 
Act in 1919—the grand pronouncement that “the prosperity of the state 
depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wageworkers, and, 
hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their families 
and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of 
questions of fault . . . .”1 
 
* Dean J. Haas received his J.D. (with distinction) from the University of North Dakota in 1983 
and an LL.M. in Health Law (honors) from the University of Houston in 2001.  Haas was counsel 
to the North Dakota Workers’ Compensation Fund from 1983-1995 and has represented hundreds 
of injured workers since.  Haas is currently practicing law at Larson Latham Huettl in Bismarck.  
1.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013). 
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In the last year for which statistics are available (2012), North Dakota 
led the country with the highest fatality rate in the work-place (17.7 per 
100,000 workers).2  At the other extreme, the state’s workers compensation 
premiums are the least expensive.3 Moreover, WSI has rebated to 
employers premiums amounting to $774.3 million since 2005.4 How do we 
keep rates so low?  This article argues that such extremities come from the 
fact that North Dakota law contains many benefit limitations and outright 
exclusions to coverage.  Most of these limitations or exclusions are created 
by statute, but some are rooted in decisions of the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.  The scope of coverage has been limited by the double-barreled 
shotgun of a blinkered view of the necessary causal relationship between 
work and injury and the adversarial litigation technique of trial by IME.  
This article addresses a number of causation issues in part II, with closely 
related “medical necessity” questions in part III. Part IV addresses disability 
issues, while Part V closes with an overview of the adversarial litigation 
posture of WSI. 
II. CAUSATION ISSUES 
A number of fault provisions now scar the “no-fault” landscape.  The 
North Dakota Worker’s Compensation Act bars compensation in 
connection with a self-inflicted injury, including suicide or attempted 
suicide;5 an injury caused by the use of intoxicants;6 an injury that arises out 
of an altercation in which the employee is the aggressor;7 and an injury that 
 
2.  Death on the Job Report, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Job-Safety/Death-on-
the-Job-Report. 
3.  The country’s 2012 median value is $1.88 per $100 of payroll, and premium rate indices 
range from a low of $1.01 in North Dakota to a high of $3.01 in Alaska.  See OREGON DEP’T OF 
CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., 2012 OREGON WORKERS COMPENSATION PREMIUM RATE 
RANKING SUMMARY (2012). 
4.  In June, 2013, WSI announced it would send employers almost $160 million in payments 
as a distribution of surplus reserves, the latest in a series of eight employer rebates since 2005 
totaling nearly three quarters of a billion dollars. See Forum News Service, N.D. employers to get 
rebate, BAKKEN TODAY, June 22, 2012, 
http://www.bakkentoday.com/event/article/id/189332/publisher_ID/10/ 
5.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(2) (2013).  The burden of proof, however, is on WSI 
to establish willful self-injury.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013).   
6.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(3) (2013).  The burden of proving injury due to use 
of alcohol or a controlled substance is on WSI, but drug testing that establishes a concentration 
level at a specified amount creates a presumption that “the injury was due to [drug] impairment.”  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013). 
7.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(4) (2013).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has 
not discussed the meaning of “aggressor” under North Dakota Century Code title 65, but has in 
the context of Job Service disqualification for misconduct.  See ProServe Corp. v. Rainey, 536 
N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1995).  Professor Larson suggests that “words alone, however inflammatory, 
are not such aggression as to deprive claimant of compensation.”  1 LEX K. LARSON, WORKERS 
COMPENSATION LAW § 8.01[5][c] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
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arises out of an “illegal act committed by the injured employee.”8  
Additionally, the Act bars compensation when an employee aggravates or 
worsens his work injury in any activity “which exceed the treatment 
recommendations of the employee’s doctor . . . .”9  Nonparticipation in 
certain medical treatments10 and vocational requirements such as job 
search11 also result in termination of benefits.  These limitations generally 
deal with some act or circumstance that is deemed sufficient to bar 
compensation based on attenuation of cause between employment and 
injury.  Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court has further restricted the 
range of compensable injuries in deciding the meaning of the causal 
component of the basic compensation test. 
A. ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT 
North Dakota’s definition of “compensable injury” is plain vanilla 
standard in the industry, meaning “an injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of hazardous employment which must be established by 
medical evidence supported by objective medical findings.”12  There has 
been litigation over the meaning of “accident,”13 but the term is no longer 
controversial.  While some advocates believed that the added requirement 
of “objective medical findings” might serve to deny compensation for soft 
tissue injury and the like (injuries that are not verifiable with medical tests 
such as EMG, x-ray, or MRI), fortunately the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has held that “objective medical evidence” may “include a physician’s 
 
8.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(5) (2013).  Professor Larson states that “[t]he great 
majority of cases involving simple traffic ordinances and statutes, such as speed or stop laws, have 
failed to find willful misconduct on the strength of the violation.” Moreover, the violation must 
have caused the accident to be a valid defense.  2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 37.03.   
9.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(5) (2013).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that 
WSI “must prove the claimant knew of the specific work restrictions and intentionally engaged in 
activities exceeding those restrictions before benefits can be denied based on aggravation of a 
prior injury.”  Holen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 145, ¶ 13, 615 N.W.2d 141, 144.  
10.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(4) (2013).  Professor Larson notes that the majority of 
Courts hold that a claimant may not be required to invasive care, such as surgery, “because of the 
graver danger of the procedure involved.” 2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 10.10(3).  WSI may also 
“require the employee to begin treating with another doctor . . . .” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28 
(2013). 
11.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05.1-04(4), (6) (2013).  
12.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10) (2013).  
13.  See Stout v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 894 (N.D. 1975) 
(holding that the “by accident” requirement is satisfied if the cause is a sudden accident or a 
repetitive injury due to the routine performance of the claimant’s duties).  
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medical opinion based on an examination, a patient’s medical history, and 
the physician’s education and experience.”14 
“Course of” employment primarily refers to time and place of the 
injury,15 as in employer-paid travel outside normal work hours.  There is more 
litigation concerning the meaning of “arising out of” employment, for this 
refers to a causal connection between the work and the injury.16  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court has recently narrowed the scope of injuries that can be 
said to have a causal connection to employment. 
In 1988, the WSI Fund did not require showing of an “increased risk” of 
injury, but recognized the positional (neutral) risk doctrine, which affords 
coverage due to an actual employment risk even if the general public is also 
exposed to such risk—as in a tornado.17  In fact, many courts “no longer 
stringently apply the separate elements of the compensation causation test 
‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ employment, favoring a more general 
causal nexus standard.”18  For the first time in Fetzer v. Workforce Safety 
and Insurance,19 the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the positional 
risk doctrine, which grounds awards for workplace injuries arising from a 
“neutral” risk—that is, a risk neither directly associated with the 
employment, nor personal to the employee.20  Rejecting the positional risk 
theory under the premise that the injury could have just as well occurred at 
home is to imagine a contrary history that did not occur—a notoriously barren 
and fruitless exercise.21  While the Fetzer court declined to compensate an 
employee who fell while walking down a hallway at work, rejection of the 
positional risk doctrine applies with no less force to injuries that occur from 
a random tornado or terrorist attack.22  Professor Larson notes that “[i]n 
spite of the tremendous personal losses associated with the Oklahoma City 
 
14.  Myhre v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 186, ¶ 15, 653 N.W.2d 705, 710 
(quoting Engebretson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 112, ¶ 24, 595 N.W.2d 312, 319 
(Maring, J., concurring)). 
15.  Boyko v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D. 1987). 
16.  Choukalos v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 345-46 (N.D. 1988). 
17.  Clare Hochhalter & Dean J. Haas, An Introduction to N.D. Workers’ Compensation, 64 
N.D. L. REV. 173, 194 n.155 (1988). 
18.  Dean J. Haas, Falling Down on the Job:  Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a No-
Fault to a Worker Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 237 n.253 (2003).  
19.  2012 ND 73, ¶ 13, 815 N.W.2d 539, 544. 
20.  1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 4.03. 
21.  Id. at § 7.03.  
22.  Professor Larson explains that unexplained falls are a positional risk case—just as 
clearly as in the case in which a claimant is injured by a stray bullet, rabid dog, lunatic, lighting 
strike, tornado, or in a terrorist attack.  Id. at § 7.04[1][a]. Larson says “a lot of confusion, 
circumlocutions, and fictions could be avoided in the unexplained-fall cases by merely accepting the 
proposition that what is unexplained is neutral.”  Id. at § 7.04[1][c] (emphasis added).  
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bombing . . . [no case questions] the employers’ basic liability for workers’ 
compensation benefits.”23 
Unfortunately, rejection of the positional risk doctrine requires a 
claimant to prove an increased risk of injury, as in a fall:  from a height, on 
a slippery floor, over frayed carpet, due to loose shoes, or simply 
attributable to a harried response to an emergency.  The need for a unifying 
legal principle is best illustrated where employees strain to explain an 
increased risk of injury due to a fall from a height.  The history of these 
legions of cases shows that what begins as an understandable increased risk of 
injury due to fall from a great height soon extends to consider falls from a few 
feet and even to a few inches.  Professor Larson observes bitingly: 
“conclusions about the effects of falls, when one gets down to distinctions 
based on inches, become factual matters of physics and physiology rather than 
of legal principle.”24  There is no reason to extend this subjective and 
unprincipled exercise to the neutral risk cases where it is not needed.25 
It is precisely such “hard facts”—e.g., a terrorist bombing that targets 
random Americans, not particular employees—that should have steeled the 
court’s nerves to adopt Larson’s neutral risk test and avoid judicial 
gerrymandering regarding the types of neutral risks that are compensated (e.g., 
terrorist attacks and tornados only).  Adoption of the neutral risk test would 
also negate the need to draw non-principled artificial distinctions regarding the 
heights, obstacles, stresses or emergencies, articles of clothing, and more, that 
pose an ‘increased risk’ of injury from falling. 
Fetzer is also notable in that ambiguous legislative history was used to 
justify deviating from the majority coverage rule espoused by Professor 
Larson.  In 1977, at the request of the agency, the Legislature adopted the 
industry standard coverage formulation “arising out of and in the course of 
employment” in response to a court decision that had required payment of 
benefits to an employee injured in a fight at work that was rooted in 
personal animosity.26  The case citing this change in the legislative history, 
 
23.   Id. at § 7.02[2]. 
24.  Id. at § 9.01[4][d]. 
25.  Larson notes that “[p]roving increased risk can be quite difficult,” discussing a decision in a 
jurisdiction, Illinois, that does not accept the positional risk theory.  Id. at § 7.02[4] (citing Brady v. 
Louis Ruffalo & Sons Constr. Co., 578 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. 1991)).  Larson concludes that the decision 
may even bar compensation for a claimant seeking to recover “from a September 11-like attack . . . .”  
Id.  It seems clear that denying benefits for unexplained fall claimants may have unintended 
consequences.  
26.  Fetzer v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 73, ¶ 18, 815 N.W.2d 539, 542.  The 
statute was actually amended in 1977 to overturn a lower court decision allowing compensation 
for an injury occurring to an employee as a result of a personally motivated fight.  See Mitchell v. 
Sanborn, 536 N.W.2d 678, 684 n.4 (1995).  If an assault is personally motivated or a fall occurs due to 
a personal risk of the employee, Larson says that it then makes sense to apply the principle that the 
employment must contribute to the risk of injury.  1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 9.01[4][b].  
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Mitchell v. Sanborn,27 was a horseplay case.  Notably, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, citing Professor Larson, recognized that modern workers’ 
compensation principles had evolved to place the risk of loss on the employer 
unless the risk is distinctly personal.28  The horseplay cases show a remarkable 
change from a rule disfavoring compensation to perpetrators, to a rule favoring 
awards.29  Larson notes that the “arising” element is remarkably simple to 
meet:  “once it has been concluded that the horseplay activity was no 
departure from employment,” the “the ‘arising’ test can be simply met by 
the argument that if the activity itself qualifies as part of the employment, 
and the harm arises out of that activity, then the harm arises out of the 
employment of which that activity was a part.”30  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court similarly stated that the compensation test is whether the 
horseplay activity (horseplay is itself never a work duty) is nevertheless 
somehow “commingled with his duties.”31 
The Fetzer court did not answer the most basic of all questions:  if 
horseplay can be commingled with duty, why isn’t walking down a hallway at 
work?  Perpetrators of horseplay are entitled to compensation not because they 
pose an increased risk of injury to themselves, but because the ‘arising’ 
element is satisfied unless the perpetrator had deviated from her employment.  
Mitchell shows that the 1977 amendment was necessary to ensure that 
compensation does not flow from a distinctly personal risk of injury, whether 
in an idiopathic fall, or a personally motivated assault. 
Because the legislative history is indeed contradictory, the Fetzer court 
also found comfort in legislative revocation of the rule of liberal 
construction.32  This is a slim reed, one that does not bear the weight.  The 
legislative history of the revocation of the rule of liberal construction 
presents a caricature of the courts “second guessing” the Agency.  Its major 
proponent, Representative Carlson, thought that courts were liberally 
construing the facts, stating: “cases are to be decided strictly based on the 
facts of each case.”33  While premium rates were part of the discussion, the 
actuary confirmed that rejection of the rule of liberal construction is “not 
 
27.  536 N.W.2d at 685. 
28.  Id. at 684 (citing 1A LARSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 23.00, 23.20, 
23.60 (1995)). 
29.  2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 23.06.  Victims of horseplay are now uniformly 
compensated.  Id. at § 23.02. 
30.  Id. at § 23.07[1].  
31.  Mitchell, 536 N.W.2d at 685.  The perpetrator’s injury would have been compensable as the 
“momentary act of horseplay was commingled with his duties.” Id. 
32.  Fetzer v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 73, ¶ 12, 815 N.W.2d 539, 543 
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (2011)). 
33.  Hearing on H.B. 1217 Before H. Judiciary Comm., 54th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 
(N.D. 1995) (statement of Rep. Carlson). 
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projected to have a material impact on the required rate and loss reserve 
levels of the Fund.”34  Senator Wayne Stenehjem observed that labor’s 
concerns about the bill were “over-reacting,” citing cases that reject giving 
liberal construction to the facts but allowing questions of law to be decided 
based on “similar doctrines requiring reference to ‘legislative purpose 
which prompted their enactment,’ as well as ‘the policy to be 
accomplished,’ ‘the evil to be remedied, and the object to be obtained.’”35 
It is also notable that the expansive coverage afforded to instigators of 
horseplay in Mitchell was not dependent upon the rule of liberal 
construction.36  Clearly, the abrogation of liberal construction in 1995 does 
not logically instruct us what the Legislature had intended in adopting the 
plain vanilla standard definition of compensable injury in 1977.  While 
providing benefits to instigators of horseplay may appear to benefit 
employees, probably the primary effect of this rule is to shield employers 
from suit.  While the immunity shield is inviolate, the basic coverage 
formulation as to the arising element is easily allowed to erode the right to 
sure and certain relief.37  The liberal construction doctrine appeared to be a 
feel-good mantra, cited to support a known outcome.  More prescient were 
the authors of Are Employees Obtaining “Sure and Certain Relief” Under 
the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the North Dakota Workers 
Compensation Act,38 who said “[p]erhaps the greatest travesty of the 1995 
amendments was to deny the injured employee liberal construction under 
the Workers’ Compensation Act.”39 
B. MENTAL INJURIES 
North Dakota is also deficient in its treatment of the mentally ill, 
excluding from the definition of compensable injury any “mental injury 
arising from mental stimulus.”40  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
commonly exists without a physical trauma.  The United States 
 
34.  Id. at 9 (The fiscal note states the change is not projected to have a material impact on 
the Fund).  
35.  Hearing on H.B. 1217 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 54th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 14-16 
(statement by Sen. Wayne Stenehjem) (citing Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 236 
N.W.2d 870, 882 (N.D. 1975); Kash-N-Karry vs. Johnson, 617 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993)). 
36.  The court observed in the footnote discussing the legislative history of SB 2158, that 
“former cases” invoked the rule.  Mitchell, 536 N.W.2d at 684 n.4.  
37.  See Haas, supra note 18, at 289-97. 
38.  Susan J. Anderson, and Gerald (Jud) Deloss, Are Employees Obtaining “Sure and 
Certain Relief” Under the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the North Dakota Workers 
Compensation Act, 72 N.D. L. REV. 349, 378-80 (1996). 
39.  Id. at 378. 
40.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(10) (2013). 
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Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs are deeply concerned about 
PTSD, which is now known to be a typical reaction to severe mental 
stress.41  Professor Larson is deeply critical of the “mental-mental” 
exclusion, as “[t]here is nothing talismanic about physical impact,” and 
unjustifiably shifts the risk of loss from the employer to employee.42  Early 
on, courts grounded such awards in physical damage to the brain, stating 
that the requirement of physical injury “must refer to the entire body . . . a 
living, breathing, functioning individual . . . not as a static, inanimate 
thing.”43  Medical science establishes the essential truth that the brain is a 
physical thing that itself changes not only during personality formation and 
under severe stress, but in the everyday as when memories form.44  
Nevertheless, Professor Larson argues that once an employee establishes 
damages with a causal connection to employment, the additional 
requirement to identify the precise physical structures involved is “wearing 
thin.”45 
Frankly, there is no justification for this exclusion.  The hostility 
toward compensation for purely mental or emotional injuries demonstrated 
by North Dakota and a significant minority of state legislatures is not 
supported by science or any sound compensation principle.  Indeed, the 
exclusion highlights the dissonance between the legal and scientific 
conceptions.  This defense-minded strategy is based on the theory that 
mental injuries are less real than physical ones and that they are not 
generally work-related but attributable to the employee’s psychological 
predisposition.46  The line between mental and physical injuries is 
intellectually shabby, and inexcusably cheap to workers.  Such mind/body 
distinctions have been criticized by science and philosophy ever since its 
most famous proponent, Rene Descartes, set it out in the terms by which it 
is known today.  This discord between compensation law on the one hand, 
and ethics, economics, and science on the other is profoundly disturbing 
 
41.  The military has found that initial estimates of the incidence of PTSD must be revised 
higher.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, CONTRACTED REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS’ READJUSTMENT STUDY (2013).  See also Lisa K. Richardson et 
al., Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related PTSD:  A Critical Review, 44 AUSTRALIAN AND 
NEW ZEALAND J. OF PSYCHIATRY 4 (2010). 
42.  3 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 56.04[1] (quoting Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay, & Carr Co., 
330 N.E.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. 1975)).  
43.  Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1955).  See also Indemnity Ins. 
Co. of N. Am. v. Loftis, 120 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).  
44.  See, e.g., Lisa M. Shin et al., Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in the Amygdala and 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex During Traumatic Imagery in Male and Female Vietnam Veterans With 
PTSD, 61 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (2004).  
45.  3 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 56.04[1].  
46.  See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation Reform, 
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 783-87 (1998).  
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because this shift of an employment risk to employees is not a rare event, as 
there is increasing acknowledgment that workplace stress and mental 
injuries are rampant.47 
The idea that allowing mental stress claims will burden the system 
because they are too easy to prove, shifting non-employment risks to the 
employer are not tenable.  The competing concepts are illustrated by a 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in 2005, where a majority upheld that 
state’s mental/mental exclusion against an equal protection challenge, 
giving short shrift to bank teller’s fright and emotional shock from being 
robbed and diagnosed with PTSD.48  Rather, like Pilate was said to do, the 
majority washed its hands of the iniquity, admitting that although 
“psychological and psychiatric injuries may arise from an individual’s 
employment, and we do not discount their impact on those who suffer 
them,” nevertheless, the policy choice made by the state legislature did not 
offend the constitution.49  The dissent is based in reality and found no 
rational basis for distinguishing mental/mental injuries from those mental 
injuries arising out of a physical insult to the body.50 
North Dakota has also enacted a significantly restrictive statute 
regarding coverage for mental injuries that arise from a physical injury, 
adding the unrealistic requirement that the employee must prove the work 
contribution is “at least fifty percent of the cause of the condition as 
compared with all other contributing causes combined, and only when the 
condition did not preexist the work injury.”51  WSI apparently reads the 
statute to exclude compensation if there had been a previous diagnosis of 
the psychological condition.  It is as though destiny precludes a new 
psychological injury. North Dakota law is extremely conservative and 
punitive in this regard.  The state should adopt the normal rule for 
compensability of mental injuries—whether the work is a “substantial 
contributing factor” to the condition claimed.52 
 
47.  The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health notes that 25-40% of all 
employees report significant job stress, more than with any other life stressor, including financial 
problems and family problems.  See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
STRESS . . . At Work, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99-
101/. 
48.  McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 839 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 2005).  
49.  Id. at 10.  
50.  Justice Resnick observed: “[n]ow what kind of rational explanation or legitimate state 
interest could possibly justify distinguishing the compensability of one posttraumatic stress 
disorder from another under equivalent life-threatening circumstances based on the fortuity of a 
stubbed toe?”  Id. at 11-12 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
51.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(a)(6) (2013). 
52.  See, e.g., Ex parte Saad’s Healthcare Servs., Inc., 19 So.3d 862 (Ala. 2008) (quoting 3 
LARSON’S WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW § 56.03[1] (2008)). 
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C. NARROW CAUSATION UNDER THE TRIGGER STATUTE 
As argued above, “but for” causal reasoning has, until recently, 
satisfied the “arising” test, especially since the competing “increased risk” 
test poses alternative history scenarios in which the employee could also 
have been injured as a member of the general public.53  The exploration of 
alternative histories that did not occur in our universe lead nowhere. 
Causation is notoriously difficult in science and philosophy; as Professor 
Prosser said, in some sense “the fatal trespass doe by Eve was cause of all 
our woe.”54  Unfortunately, North Dakota is transfixed with one view of the 
Necker cube in determining causation: an erroneous focus on preexisting 
susceptibility to injury under the “trigger statute,” North Dakota Century 
Code section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7).55 
The statute, repeatedly amended, excludes benefits for preexisting 
conditions, “including when the employment acts as a trigger to produce 
symptoms in the preexisting . . . condition unless the employment 
substantially accelerates its progression or substantially worsens its 
severity.”56  Under WSI’s blinkered view of causation, the focus is on the 
morphology.  An MRI, for example, will show that degenerative disc 
disease exists in most of us over age thirty or so, but most of us will not 
have any symptoms.  WSI commonly calls its medical consultant or an 
independent medical examiner (“IME”) to testify that an employee’s work 
injury “merely triggered symptoms” in degenerative disc disease but did not 
alter the course of the “disease itself.”57  But which is the better measure of 
a worsening: the change in the appearance of an MRI or the shattering of 
the very health and life of the employee by injury?  Though the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has twice ruled that pain can be a significant 
worsening of a preexisting condition,58 the battle continues to rage, as WSI 
asked the 2013 Legislature to amend the statute to preclude a significant 
change in pain complaints to evidence change in a preexisting condition.59 
 
53.  In a classic positional risk case, a court noted: 
[t]he [alternative history] question whether or not the employee might have been 
injured in the same way, and even at the same place and time had he not been 
called there by the necessities of his employer’s business, but had gone there 
only for his own pleasure or in pursuit of his own business, has nothing whatever 
to do with the case. 
Kern v. Southport Mill, 141 So. 19, 21 (La. 1932). 
54.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 236 (5th ed. 1984). 
55.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) (2013). 
56.  Id. 
57.  Haas, supra note 18, at 237-38.  
58.  See generally Mickelson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, 820 N.W.2d 
333; Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621. 
59.  H.B. 1163, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).  
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WSI’s litigation strategy elevates the “trigger statute” to an exception 
that swallows the rule by forcing a tight focus on the preexisting 
morphology to deny coverage.  According to WSI’s Performance Evaluator, 
the agency’s claims adjusters reported a “shift in management focus to a 
more aggressive and in-depth search for prior injuries or pre-
existing/degenerative conditions, which could possibly reduce WSI liability 
for the injury.”60  On paper, North Dakota continues to follow the well-
known and universally accepted maxim that susceptibility to injury is not 
relevant, as the employer takes the employee as he finds him.61  “Putatively, 
almost every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some 
preexisting weakness or susceptibility.”62  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court has long held that “[t]he fact that an employee may have physical 
conditions or personal habits which make him or her more prone to such an 
injury does not constitute a sufficient reason for denying a claim . . . . To 
the contrary, the work injury need only be a ‘substantial contributing 
factor.’”63  In stark contrast to the current predilection to blame every spinal 
complaint on preexisting morphology, the 1980s era North Dakota Supreme 
Court held compensable a disc injury that, according to the treating 
physician, resulted from “minute trauma” from her hair-dressing job, 
causing the annulus “fibers supporting the disc [to] give way.”64 
The foremost authority on workers’ compensation law, Professor 
Larson, notes that “[n]othing is better established in compensation law than 
the rule that, when industrial industry precipitates disability from a prior 
latent condition, such as heart disease, cancer, back weakness and the like, 
the entire disability is compensable,” and “degeneration and infirmities due 
to age,” are not grounds for reduction of benefits.65  Larson states the 
central tenant that susceptible employees are also entitled to sure and 
certain relief, “the employer takes the employee as it finds that 
employee”—thus, “[p]reexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does 
not disqualify a claim under the ‘arising out of employment’ [causal] 
requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with 
the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which 
 
60.  N.D. WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE, 2008 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (2008), 
http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/WSI_PE_08.pdf. 
61.  Bruns v. N.D. Worker’s Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 116, ¶ 16 n.2, 595 N.W.2d 298, 303 
n.2. 
62.  Balliet v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 795 (N.D. 1980). 
63.  Manske v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2008 ND 79, ¶ 12, 748 N.W.2d 394, 397 
(quoting Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982)). 
64.  Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 830.  
65.  5 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 90.04[1]. 
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compensation is sought.”66  Thus, the bedrock workers’ compensation 
principle is to place the risk of loss on the industry that caused the 
claimant’s damages.  Any other result alters the basic bargain between 
employees and employers in which employees exchange the right to sue 
employers in tort in for “sure and certain relief” in the form of medical and 
disability benefits.67 
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a compensable 
aggravation of arthritis does include a worsening of symptoms.68  Applying 
the former incarnation of the trigger statute, the administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) denied benefits concluding that the employment was “merely a 
trigger,” to her pain.69  The ALJ also concluded that there was no evidence 
that the employment was a substantial aggravating factor.70  Upon appeal, 
the court reversed and remanded because there was evidence that the 
employee’s work activities “resulted in her latent underlying condition of 
arthritis becoming symptomatic and painful.  Pain can be an aggravation of 
an underlying condition of arthritis.”71  The majority found the distinction 
between worsening the “condition itself” and the symptoms to be without 
significance.72 
Although the statute was subsequently amended, WSI’s then counsel, 
Regan Pufall, advised the Legislature that “[t]his bill does not significantly 
change the substance of this paragraph. It removes unnecessary and 
confusing language.”73  Mr. Pufall testified that the trigger exclusion means 
that a condition that is getting progressively worse is not compensable if it 
merely takes a turn for the worse at work but is compensable if the 
employment significantly alters the significance of the condition “so that it got 
much worse more quickly than it would have otherwise.”74 
The focus, as the Geck court found, is squarely on the significance of the 
damages suffered by the injured employee.  Accordingly, Professor Larson 
observes that “denials of compensation in this category [due to a preexisting 
condition] are almost entirely the result of holdings that the evidence did not 
support a finding that the employment contributed to the final result 
 
66.  Id. at § 9.02[1]. 
67.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013). 
68.  Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621. 
69.  Id. ¶ 11, 583 N.W.2d at 624. 
70.  Id.  
71.  Id. ¶ 10. 
72.  Id.  
73.  See Hearing on H.B. 1269 Before H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 55th Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 5 (N.D. 1997) (testimony of Reagan Pufall). 
74.  Id.  
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[damages].”75  Post Geck, the North Dakota Supreme Court repeatedly said 
that it is not necessary under the “trigger statute” to show the employment 
was the sole cause of the injury.76  Rather, to establish a causal connection 
under the statute, the claimant must demonstrate his employment was “a 
substantial contributing factor” to the disease or injury.77  Employment 
plays a substantial causal role where it worsens or aggravates the pre-
existing condition, causing damages that would not have occurred but for 
the employment. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue numerous times 
over the years, frequently upholding an ALJ’s findings of fact that the 
claimant’s work injury merely “triggered symptoms” rather than 
substantially worsened the preexisting condition.  In Bruder v. North 
Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance Fund,78 WSI attributed the 
claimant’s pain to his degenerative disc disease that had been symptomatic 
for many years before he filed his workers’ compensation claim.79  
Similarly, in Bergum v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,80 
the claimant “had a long history of treatment for back pain,” which baseline 
condition included “daily low back discomfort, and . . . the regular use of an 
anti-inflammatory drug and a muscle relaxant.”81  Curran v. North Dakota 
Workforce Safety and Insurance82 also details a long history of back 
symptoms prior to the alleged work injury, triggered by bending down to 
pick up a band-aid.83 
While another ALJ might have found differently in these cases, the 
courts will not overturn factual findings that a “reasoning mind” could have 
made.84  Unfortunately, all too frequently the factual findings of ALJs are 
conclusory as to whether the employee has proven a compensable 
worsening.  ALJs typically do not make any specific findings relating to the 
change in the employee’s disability status and increased demand for 
 
75.  1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 9.02[4]. 
76.  2009 ND 23, ¶ 8, 761 N.W.2d 588, 591-92. 
77.  Id. at 592. 
78.  Id. ¶ 2, 761 N.W.2d at 590. 
79.  Id. 
80.  2009 ND 52, 764 N.W.2d 178. 
81.  Id. ¶ 19, 764 N.W.2d at 184.   
82.  2010 ND 227, 791 N.W.2d 622. 
83.  Id. ¶ 1, 791 N.W.2d at 622.  
84.  The court’s deferential review standard is well known; the court affirms the agency if a 
reasoning mind “could have” reached the decision.  See, e.g., Kershaw v. Workforce Safety & 
Ins., 2013 ND 186, ¶ 10, 838 N.W.2d 429, 432.  But the old cases retain a hint of true scrutiny of 
fact-findings.  See, e.g., Spangler v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 519 N.W. 2d 576, 578 (N.D. 
1994) (remanding for the agency to conduct further examinations of the various medical opinions 
on offer); Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824 (N.D. 1982) (reversing 
based on the testimony of the treating physician). 
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medical services stemming from the work injury.  The cases illustrate that 
the ALJs are more apt to focus only on whether or not the preexisting 
condition substantially contributed to the final result, rather than on the 
pertinent question:  whether the work injury substantially contributed to the 
final result.  Damages, after all, are measured by the increased need for 
medical care, and placing of work restrictions.  It seems as though ALJs are 
prone to finding a natural progression of any preexisting condition, 
crediting IME doctors over treating physicians.  But the focus is generally 
on a progression of the preexisting morphology rather than on whether the 
employee’s symptoms would have progressed in a similar manner but for 
the work injury.  Unfortunately, the predilection appears to be akin to the 
judicial review of deferring to the agency rather than using a de novo 
determination of the facts required for a fair hearing. 
ALJs should be required to show critical examination of the effects of 
both the preexisting condition and the work injury in the findings.  This 
might be accomplished if the courts critically review the findings of WSI as 
it once did.  Alternatively, if WSI is actually interested in an even-handed 
adjudication, it could promulgate an administrative rule detailing the criteria 
by which a significant worsening of the condition is proved.  For example, 
the OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook85 provides an industry example of the 
definition of a significant aggravation of a pre-existing condition, defining a 
significant aggravation of a pre-existing injury to include “[o]ne or more 
days away from work, or days of restricted work” due to injury, or 
“[m]edical treatment in a case where no medical treatment was needed for 
the injury or illness before the workplace event or exposure, or a change in 
medical treatment was necessitated by the workplace event or exposure.”86 
In 2012, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in Mickelson v. North 
Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,87 again stressed that the root of the 
issue is whether the claimant’s pre-existing injury or condition is such that 
its clinical course would naturally progress on its own timetable without 
regard to the employment in which the employee was engaged.  The court 
clarified that to afford compensation, the employment contribution must “in 
some real, true, important, or essential way [make] the preexisting injury, 
 
85.  OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, OSHA RECORD KEEPING 
HANDBOOK:  THE REGULATION AND RELATED INTERPRETATION FOR RECORDING AND 
REPORTING OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESS 14 (2006), 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/recordkeeping/OSHA_3245_REVISED.pdf. 
86.  Id. 
87.  2012 ND 164, 820 N.W.2d 333. 
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disease or other condition more unfavorable, difficult, unpleasant, or 
painful.”88 
The Mickelson court  
decline[d] to construe [the statute] so narrowly as to require only 
evidence of a substantial worsening of the disease itself to 
authorize an award of benefits.  Rather, the statute . . . requires 
consideration of whether the preexisting injury, disease or other 
condition would have progressed similarly in the absence of 
employment.89  
The court said that “employment can also substantially worsen the 
severity, or substantially accelerate the progression of a preexisting injury, 
disease, or other condition when employment acts as a substantial 
contributing factor to substantially increase a claimant’s pain.  That 
conclusion is consistent with our decision in Geck, that pain can be a 
substantial aggravation of an underlying latent condition.”90  The ALJ, the 
court said: 
misapplied the law by looking too narrowly at . . . degenerative 
disc disease itself without considering whether his injury, disease, 
or other condition would likely not have progressed similarly in 
the absence of his employment so as to substantially accelerate the 
progression or substantially worsen the severity of his injury, 
disease, or other condition.91  
The case was remanded to WSI. 
D. WSI INTRODUCED THE “PAIN BILL,” H.B. 1163, IN AN EFFORT TO 
ELIMINATE PAIN AS EVIDENCE OF A WORSENING  
IN A PREEXISTING CONDITION 
In reaction to Mickelson, WSI offered legislation to amend the “trigger 
statute,” North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7), to provide 
that “[p]ain is a symptom and is not a substantial acceleration or substantial 
worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition.”92  WSI 
representatives testified in favor of this drastic change to the law, yet 
contending that Mickelson represented a change in interpretation of the 
 
88.  Id. ¶ 36, 820 N.W.3d at 346. 
89.  Id. ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d at 342. 
90.  Id. ¶ 20. 
91.  Id. ¶ 23, 820 N.W.2d at 344. 
92.  H.B. 1163, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). 
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statute.93  In support of the pain bill, WSI representatives further advocated 
that an employee need not be taken “as is.”94  For, taking the employee as is 
forcefully contradicts WSI’s theory that even a drastic change in symptoms 
is not compensable if the morphology does not change.  Clearly, under 
WSI’s favored interpretation, an employee’s preexisting susceptibility to 
injury due to aging joints and discs is a defense.  Fortunately, the bill did 
not pass as introduced, but it is remarkable that it was offered in this stark 
form. 
This legislation reflects a profound misunderstanding of the effects of 
pain on life.  Pain is a primary generator of medical treatment.  Pain is often 
disabling.  The legislation offered by WSI could preclude compensation for 
chronic pain if the ALJ, like the IME examiner, focuses only on the 
morphology of the preexisting condition rather than on the effects of the 
injury.  Claimants’ advocates have noted that WSI commonly calls the IME 
examiner to testify that the preexisting condition is unchanged by the 
injury, and thus said to show a simple “natural progression” of the 
preexisting condition.  In many cases, claimants’ lawyers lament, the IME 
examiner does so without reference to the changes in the employee’s 
clinical condition, relying solely on whether the “objective” appearance of 
the condition appears changed on an MRI.  Yet, the worker’s life might be 
utterly shattered and ruined. 
Such unremitting pain creates a demand for medical care, including 
treatments in chronic pain programs, and may impel the doctor to place the 
employee under work restrictions.  Employees whose very lives are ruled 
by pain, unable to engage in the activities of daily living, to work, to sleep, 
to do anything at all without constant use of pain medications, have 
described this ruinous existence as a living hell.  Who among us would not 
recognize this as a significant worsening in the life of a family member?  
What, after all, is the purpose of workers’ compensation if we do not care 
about the effect of the injury on life and health in determining 
compensation?  WSI’s disturbing focus on preexisting morphology and 
discounting pain is highlighted by a case Parsons v. Workforce Safety and 
Insurance Fund,95 which was pending at the time H.B. 1163 was under 
consideration in the Legislature.  In that case, despite an IME examiner who 
found the claimant sustained a disc tear and cervical strain from his truck 
driving job, the ALJ denied the claim because his preexisting condition 
made him “especially vulnerable to injury,” and the work injury had 
 
93.  Hearing on H.B. 1163 Before the H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63d Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 49 (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Tim Whalin). 
94.  Id. 
95.  2013 ND 235, 841 N.W.2d 404.  
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resolved by the time of the hearing, and did not cause “significant damage” 
to the disc.96  It is discouraging that the dissent would have affirmed, 
elevating the susceptibility to an absolute defense, on the premise that this 
was simply a fact question.97 
Opponents of the pain bill noted that Parsons proved that WSI’s 
construction of the already conservative statute made the preexisting 
condition exclusion an exception that swallows the rule—elevating 
susceptibility to an absolute defense.  While WSI supported this legislation, 
it could not find one independent physician to testify in favor.  Its medical 
consultant did testify in favor, stating that “[n]o physician can reliably 
measure pain,” but “if the Mickelson case progresses to where a person’s 
report of increased pain in a preexisting condition establishes a 
compensable injury, unreliability will become prevalent in the system.”98  
WSI’s medical consultant claimed that despite the language in the 
legislation that “pain is a symptom and not a substantial acceleration or 
substantial worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition,” 
the bill “does not eliminate the symptom of pain as an important evidence 
of a work injury.”99 
As a result of persistent opposition to this legislation, including from 
Senator Ralph Kilzer, a physician and former medical consultant for WSI, 
the bill was amended to state “[p]ain is a symptom and may be considered 
in determining whether there is a substantial acceleration or substantial 
worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition, but pain alone 
is not a substantial acceleration or a substantial worsening.”100  The 
legislation does not alleviate Chief Justice VandeWalle’s concern about the 
failure of the statute to distinguish a substantial worsening in the severity of 
an underlying condition from those in which pain is simply a symptom 
triggered by employment.101  But, the Mickelson court’s focus on whether 
there is a natural progression points the way:  has the employment 
 
96.  Id. ¶ 16, 841 N.W.2d at 409.  The majority explained that the “ALJ misapplied the law 
in finding the injury was attributable to Parsons’ preexisting condition because the preexisting 
condition made him more susceptible to the injury.”  Id. ¶ 19, 841 N.W.2d at 410.  
97.  Id. ¶ 29, 841 N.W.2d at 413 (Crothers, J., dissenting).  As in Mickelson, WSI’s exclusive 
focus is on the morphology; it was not disputed that the work had caused Parsons physical injuries 
(a disc tear and cervical/trapezius strain) and had caused him significant damage—medical 
expenses and disability.  WSI’s focus on mere morphology is misplaced, “[p]utatively, almost 
every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some preexisting weakness or 
susceptibility.”  Balliet v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980) 
(emphasis added).  
98.  Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 93, at 98-99 (testimony of Gregory Peterson). 
99.  Id. at 99. 
100.  Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 93, at 123. 
101.  Mickelson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, ¶ 30, 820 N.W.2d 333, 
345 (VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring). 
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substantially changed the nature of the medical care needed and the 
disability, or has it not?  If medical care is periodically needed both before 
and after an employment incident that caused an employee to go to the 
doctor, a simple flare-up in a condition prone to flare-ups is probably not 
compensable. 
The best place to start is to measure the change in the employee’s 
clinical course:  the medical attention required and the work restrictions 
placed.  The Federal Workers Compensation Act attempts to distinguish the 
mere manifestation of the preexisting injury at work from an aggravation, 
stating that “the fact that the condition manifests itself during a period of 
federal employment” is not “sufficient in itself to establish causal 
relationship.”102  However, the regulations and cases show that a condition 
is compensable if the injury acted on the preexisting condition and 
temporarily or permanently aggravated it.103  Similarly, OSHA is of the 
view that an employment injury that substantially alters the need for 
medical attention is a significant worsening of a preexisting condition.104 
The outright oddity of the pain bill is further highlighted by the fact 
that the Legislature had agreed in 2009 that the preexisting condition issue 
required study, recognizing that North Dakota law excluding coverage for 
preexisting conditions is more restrictive than other jurisdictions.105  In 
recommending study of the issue, the 2009 House Resolution cited WSI’s 
2008 Performance Evaluation documenting North Dakota’s extremely 
conservative approach to deny claims based on presence of preexisting 
morphology.106  Thus, Study Recommendation 6.6 was to create a “study 
group formed of all the stakeholder groups . . . to review how other 
jurisdictions’ statutes handle these important Workers’ Compensation 
issues.”107 
Rather than engage all “stakeholder[s],” WSI itself presented 
information to the Legislature’s interim committee, and asked the next 
 
102.  20 C.F.R. § 10.1115(e) (2009). 
103.  See OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, INJURY COMPENSATION FOR 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES (1994), http://www.dol.gov/owcp/regs/compliance/feca810m htm#3.  The 
handbook provides that determining the causal relationship “is based entirely on medical evidence 
provided by physicians who have examined and treated the employee.”  Id. at § 3(5).  Under the 
federal rules, both temporary and permanent aggravations are compensated.  “Permanent 
aggravation occurs when a condition will persist indefinitely due to the effects of the work-related 
injury or when a condition is materially worsened by a factor of employment such that it will not 
return to the pre-injury state.”  Id. at § 3(5)(b).  This focus is proper, as it measures the effect of 
the employment on the damages and the need for medical care and disability.  
104.  See OSHA RECORD KEEPING HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 73. 
105.  H. Con. Res. 3008, 61st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess 1 (N.D. 2009). 
106.  2008 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 57, at 111. 
107.  Id.  
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performance evaluator, Sedgwick, to address the issue.108  Sedgwick 
averred that although some other states might be as conservative as North 
Dakota in attributing damages to preexisting conditions, the state is not a 
lone outlier.109  Sedgwick cited case law from Wisconsin for this 
proposition.110 
Contrary to Sedgwick’s characterization of Wisconsin cases as equally 
conservative as the North Dakota statute, the test in that state is whether the 
work injury caused a substantial change in symptoms “in the form of a 
precipitation, aggravation, and acceleration of the applicant’s preexisting 
back condition beyond normal progression.”111  In discussing “normal 
progression” to determine compensability, the Wisconsin courts use a 
similar test as expounded in Mickelson, that compensation depends upon: 
whether or not the underlying preexisting injury, disease, or other 
condition would likely have progressed similarly in the absence of 
employment . . . . We decline to construe those terms so narrowly 
as to require only evidence of a substantial worsening of the 
disease itself to authorize an award of benefits.112 
Sedgwick is not reliable for the claim that North Dakota law is not an 
outlier.  The dissent in Geck had earlier also offered case authority said to 
deny that a significant change in pain complaints constitutes a compensable 
aggravation of a preexisting condition.  For example, the dissent said that in 
Oregon a work injury did not cause any new anatomical injuries that could 
be observed is not compensable, even though it “aggravated” her 
preexisting condition as it increased her pain.113  However, this was a claim 
for occupational disease which is distinguished from accidental injuries in 
that occupational disease is not unexpected and are recognized as an 
 
108.  NORTH DAKOTA WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2010 PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 88-98 (2010), 
https://www.workforcesafety.com/library/documents/reports/PerformanceEvaluation8-09-10.pdf. 
109.  Id. at 93.  
110.  Id. (explaining that “Wisconsin precludes benefits for any injury or condition pre-
existing at the time of employment with the employer against whom a claim is made.”). 
111.  Greenfield Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm’n, 776 N.W.2d 288, 
291 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).  See also Aurora Health Care Metro, Inc. v. Labor & 
Indus. Review Comm’n, 776 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an increase in 
the limitations on the employee’s daily living and work restrictions showed an “aggravation, 
acceleration and precipitation of her preexisting condition beyond its normal progression”); 
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 686 N.W.2d 456 (finding that the 
employee’s actual living (clinical) condition is simply due to a natural progression of a preexisting 
degenerative disc disease).  
112.  Mickleson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d 303, 
342. 
113.  Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, ¶ 20, 583 N.W.2d 621, 625 
(Sanstrom J., dissenting) (citing In re Hall v. Home Ins. Co., 651 P.2d 186, 187 (Or. Ct. App. 
1982)). 
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inherent risk of continued exposure to conditions of the particular 
employment and are gradual rather than sudden in onset.114  Thus, 
aggravation of symptoms makes no sense for occupational disease claims. 
Oregon analyzes most cases under the “combined condition” statute, which 
provides: 
If an otherwise compensable injury combines at any time with a 
preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for 
treatment, the combined condition is compensable only if, so long 
as and to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the 
major contributing cause of the disability of the combined 
condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment 
of the combined condition.115 
As in federal law, Oregon holds that if the work injury changes the 
work restrictions sufficiently to cause disability or causes the claimant to 
require medical attention not previously needed, the entire condition is 
compensable. 
The Geck dissent also cited a number of cases from Tennessee to argue 
that pain cannot constitute a compensable aggravation.116  Tennessee law is 
more nuanced, providing that if a work injury advances the severity of the 
pre-existing condition or the employee suffers a new distinct injury other 
than increased pain, then the work injury is compensable.117  In other 
words, if pain is said by the claimant’s doctors to be indicative of an injury, 
as is inflammation or microscopic tearing, the clinical worsening can be 
compensable.  Medical causation recognizes that pain is normally 
indicative of an injury.  Nature designed this feedback mechanism to avoid 
additional injuries, including the everyday wear and tear that if allowed to 
accumulate unnoticed, can result in much more significant damage to the 
body.  ALJ’s should not focus solely on ‘natural progression of 
 
114.  In re Hall, 651 P.2d at 188. 
115.  OR. REV. STAT. § 656.005(7)(a)(B) (2012). 
116.  Geck, ¶¶ 22-23, 583 N.W.2d at 626 (citing Towsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 
2002); Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991); Smith v. 
Smith’s Transfer Corp., 735 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1987)).  
117.  See Trosper v. Armstrong Wood Prod., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 598, 604-07 (Tenn. 2008).  
See also Vawter v. Volunteer Mgmt. Dev., No. W2012-00471-SC-WCM-WC, 2013 WL 542812, 
at *4 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2013) (finding that although work activities did not “progress” her condition, 
the fact that work made it “more symptomatic and painful” with “an anatomical explanation for 
the increase in [claimant’s] symptoms during her [employment]” was sufficient to afford 
compensation).  North Dakota must similarly focus on the effects of the work injury, rather than on 
the morphology.  Unfortunately, many Administrative Law Judges continue to find credible the 
ipse dixit opinion of IME examiners who blithely conclude that the work injury did not 
substantially worsen a preexisting condition.  This leads to an inordinate number of denials that 
are then upheld on appeal for reasons of fact.  
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morphology,’ as do most IME examiners, but also the change in the 
employee’s need for medical care and in work restrictions caused by the 
work aggravation. 
As introduced, H.B. 1163 would have expressly denied for all 
employees any opportunity to establish that a significant increase in pain 
from an employment injury constitutes a significant worsening in a 
preexisting degenerative condition.  This offends basic compensation 
principles, and North Dakota law has never so held.  Even as enacted, the 
legislation is a retrograde step, as it questions the central principle of 
workers’ compensation law, which states that the industry that created the 
risk of damage to the employee must bear the loss.  While WSI argued at 
the legislative hearing that North Dakota does not necessarily follow this 
sacrosanct principle that the worker should be taken “as is,” as yet the North 
Dakota Supreme Court continues to hold that simple susceptibility to injury 
is not a defense.118  In tort law the focus is on whether or not the injury 
produced the symptoms and damages,119 not on the appearance of the MRI 
for MRIs of the spine show a near universal affliction of aging discs by age 
thirty.  After all, MRIs of the spine show a near universal affliction of aging 
discs by age thirty.  But most people are not symptomatic, and DDD itself 
does not necessarily correlate with its appearance on the MRI.  WSI created 
a straw man arguing that absent this legislation, the agency will become a 
general insurance carrier, on the theory that simple triggering of any 
symptom will be compensable.  This is nonsense.  As the discussion of 
federal law on this point shows, preexisting conditions that are progressing 
of their own accord and on their own natural timetable are not worsened 
beyond their normal progression by simple manifestation of symptoms in 
the workplace.  WSI also threatened the legislature with the portent of dire 
financial consequences if the law was not changed.  This cry of wolf also 
does not wash, since the Court has given the statute the same legal meaning 
from 1998 through the present, without any negative financial 
consequences to the fund.  This legislation, which may allow WSI to blame 
an injury on the employee’s susceptibility to injury due to abnormal 
morphology, mocks sure and certain relief. 
 
118.  Manske v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 79, ¶12, 748 N.W.2d 394, 397; 
Bruns v. N.D. Worker’s Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 116, ¶ 16 n.2, 595 N.W.2d 298, 303 n.2.  
119.  Modern tort principles distinguish between the eggshell plaintiff doctrine and the 
aggravation doctrine.  The eggshell plaintiff rule applies when the condition had been 
asymptomatic prior to injury, which is distinct from the aggravation doctrine that applies when 
there is a prior symptomatic injury.  Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 740-41 (Minn. 2005) 
(noting difference between aggravation and eggshell-plaintiff rules); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 cmt. a (1965) (noting that eggshell-plaintiff rule applies to “peculiar 
physical condition” of the plaintiff).  
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E. THE AGGRAVATION STATUTE 
Few commentators support a reduction in benefits in the circumstances 
in which a work injury acts upon a preexisting injury combining to produce 
damages.  The 1972 National Commission on Workers Compensation 
recommended that full compensation be paid to an employee when both 
work and nonwork causes substantially contribute to an injury or disease.120  
Similarly, Professor Larson notes that the “great majority” of compensation 
acts do not reduce benefits under an apportionment of cause theory.121  
Sedgwick recommended in its performance evaluation that the aggravation 
statute be repealed,122 under the sound analysis that though only forty cases 
per year were afflicted by the statute, “[a]necdotal comments from WSI 
claim staff indicates that it is very difficult for the claim staff to identify an 
aggravation case when it is presented.”123 
Unfortunately, North Dakota has an apportionment statute,124 which 
was once liberally construed in favor of injured workers,125 but now 
conceivably applies in any case in which a prior condition is said by an 
IME examiner to “contribute” to an injury, as in increasing the risk of 
recurrence.126  Nearly any prior injury can theoretically qualify under this 
interpretation of the aggravation statute to reduce a worker’s benefits to half 
of what they should be, for whether a “causal relation” exists between the 
prior injury and the recurrence is completely within the eye of the beholder.  
This lax causation test is a lamentable retreat from the objective criteria 
once applied by the court: whether the prior injury continued to be disabling 
 
120.  NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 51 (1972), 
http://workerscompresources.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Introduction-Summary.pdf.  
121.  5 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 90.03.   
122.  See 2010 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 108, at 98. 
123.  Id. at 96. 
124.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(1) (2013) (providing an acute period of 100% 
coverage for the first sixty days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(3) (2013) (providing a 
presumption that the apportionment is 50% to the work injury and 50% to the nonwork injury or 
condition).  
125.  Formerly, the court liberally construed the requirement in the statute that to reduce and 
apportion benefits, the prior injury must be “known in advance of the work injury,” and must have 
“caused previous work restriction or interference with physical function.”  See, e.g., Elliott v. N.D. 
Workers Comp. Bureau, 435 N.W.2d 695, 698 (N.D. 1989); Jepson v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. 
Bureau, 417 N.W.2d 184, 185 (N.D. 1987). 
126.  Mickelson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 67, ¶ 1, 609 N.W.2d 74, 75.  In 
this case, the court upheld the Bureau’s reduction of the claim to a 50% award under the 
aggravation statute because an independent medical evaluator concluded that a healed injury from 
four years previously somehow made a causal contribution to the severity of a second injury to 
that area of the body.  Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 609 N.W.2d at 74-75.  The notion of cause is a notoriously 
difficult one in science.  In fact, the National Commission, Professor Larson, and Sedgwick agree 
that the aggravation statute is not based on sound compensation principles, and should be 
repealed.   
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or impairing at the time of the work injury.  The aggravation statute should 
be repealed as it can be applied to any claim in which a prior injury or 
condition can be said by an IME doctor to elevate the risk of recurrence. 
III. MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS 
WSI is responsible to provide an injured employee “reasonable and 
appropriate” medical services “necessary” to treat a compensable injury.127  
WSI frequently denies benefits—including medical benefits—for lack of 
sufficient causal relationship between employment and injury.  In such case, 
the employee has a right to a hearing under North Dakota Century Code 
chapter 28-32.  But WSI also denies medical care for lack of medical necessity 
under North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-20.  Here, the Legislature 
has created an odd—and arguably unconstitutional—alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism to resolve medical necessity disputes.128  The statute 
provides that any “managed care” dispute is subject to “binding dispute 
resolution” (“BDR”), which is not subject to the procedural protections in 
the North Dakota’s Administrative Agencies Practices Act, found in North 
Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32.129  While the Legislature has directed 
WSI to “make rules for the procedures,” the administrative code provision 
does not contain any procedural protections to safeguard due process of 
law.130 
 
A. THE RIGHT TO “REASONABLE AND NECESSARY” MEDICAL CARE 
SHOULD BE HELD A PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHT 
Unfortunately, after studiously avoiding the constitutional issue, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court recently decided that an injured employee 
does not have a protected property right regarding the appropriate prosthetic 
device to replace a hand.131  Remarkably, the court decided the 
constitutional issue even though the employee made the argument for the 
first time on appeal.132  The majority did not cite a single case holding an 
 
127.  N D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-07 (2013). 
128.  N D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-20 (2013). 
129.  Id.  
130.  The administrative code merely advises that the decision-makers—the identity of 
whom are not specified—shall review “the relevant information in the record,” and may “request 
additional information or documentation.”  N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-46(5) (2013). 
131.  Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2014 ND 79, 845 N.W.2d 632. 
132.  Whedbee filed a Notice of Appeal and Specification of Issue in McKenzie County 
asserting the myoelectric prosthesis is cost-effective and medically appropriate, and requesting 
reversal of WSI’s BDR decision Id. ¶ 6, 845 N.W.2d at 634.  Normally, of course, the court 
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employee does not have a property right to receive reasonable and 
necessary medical care.  Instead, the court shifted focus, claiming that 
medical benefits were not denied, but that merely “one prosthetic device 
was approved over another.  [Claimant] does not have a protectable 
property interest in receiving one device over another, here, a myoelectric 
prosthesis rather than a body-powered prosthesis.”133  The court said that an 
employee “must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit.]  A 
crucial factor in determining whether a particular statutory benefit 
constitutes a property interest is the nature and degree of discretion given to 
the governmental administrator in awarding or denying the benefit.”134  
According to the court, the employee must prove entitlement to the specific 
medical benefit before having a protectable property right in fair process in 
making this very determination.  This ignores that injured workers are 
entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care under the Workers 
Compensation Act; WSI does not have unfettered discretion to award or 
simply deny reasonable and necessary medical care. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that an individual has 
a protected property interest under statutory schemes that set out a right to 
benefits if certain criteria are met that do not allow program administrators 
to use unfettered discretion to award or deny benefits.135  The Act does not 
provide WSI with discretion to deny medical care but sets out a right to care 
under lawful criteria.  The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that an 
applicant for medical benefits has a protected property right in a fair 
process to determine the nature of reasonable and necessary medical care.136  
The question as to the whether a protected property right exists cannot 
logically depend upon the subsequent determination in the hearing as to the 
precise nature of that care.  That would be the very definition of the cart 
before the horse. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court had already held that an applicant for 
workers compensation benefits has the right to a fair hearing under the 
constitutional due process guarantee.137  Significantly, the court did not only 
rely upon North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32 in concluding that a 
formal hearing was required, but extensively discussed the constitutional 
 
refuses to address issues not raised in the district court.  See Risovi v. Job Service North Dakota, 
2014 ND 60, ¶ 12, 845 N.W.2d 15, 20.  
133.  Wheddbee, ¶ 11, 845 N.W.2d at 635. 
134.  Id. (quoting Ennis v. Williams Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 493 N.W.2d 675, 678 (N.D. 
1992) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted)). 
135.  Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). 
136.  Giaimo v. City of New Haven, 778 A.2d 33, 48-50 (Conn. 2001) (distinguishing Am. 
Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)).  
137.  Steele v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 702 (N.D. 1978). 
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guarantee of due process that require the result.138  In construing chapter 28-
32 to require due process safeguards, the court held that the applicant for 
workers’ compensation benefits had a right to a formal hearing.139  It would 
be odd indeed that the claimant denied a five-day claim for disability 
benefits is entitled to due process, but an employee who has lost a hand is 
not. 
While primitive societies are rightly criticized for an eye for an eye 
justice, by at least one measure, the law of talion values life and limb more 
than we do: 
Our modern economies thrive because we tend to limit personal 
liability.  If I sell you a defective ladder, and you fall and break 
your neck, I may have to pay you some compensation.  But I will 
not have to pay you nearly as much as I would be willing to pay 
not to having my own neck broken.  In our society we are 
constrained by the value a court puts on the other guys neck; in a 
culture ruled by talion law, we are constrained by the value we 
place on our own.140 
Any reasonable measure of the value of a hand must be measured from 
the view of the man or woman who lost one.  Unfortunately,  an employee 
who suffers the devastating injury of the loss of a hand at work is not 
afforded a fair and impartial hearing. 
 
B. THE BDR PROCESS DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY PROCEDURAL 
PROTECTIONS TO ENSURE A FAIR HEARING AND SHOULD BE 
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The administrative rule does not provide for an in-person hearing, a 
right to appear through counsel, or a right to cross-examine.  The decision is 
made by WSI employees, and the procedure itself is opaque—and so nearly 
immune from meaningful review—as the BDR decision does not contain 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain the grounds of the 
decision.141  Because WSI probably cannot lose a medical necessity appeal 
under the limited review standard, the agency is prone to decide even 
causation questions under the BDR statute, bypassing that annoying right to 
a hearing. 
 
138.  Id.  
139.  Id.  
140.  SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN 
VALUES 61 n.93 (2001).  
141.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-20 (2013). 
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If the Legislature or a subsequent court corrects the Whedbee error that 
an employee who loses a hand does not have a protectable property right, it 
seems apparent that the BDR procedure currently in use by WSI must also 
be altered to provide some minimal level of due process.  For example, in 
Jassek v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,142 counsel argued 
that although there are many ways to afford basic procedural protections,143 
the Administrative Code provides none of them.  In contrast to the 
requirement in the APA that findings of fact and conclusions of law be entered 
to explain the grounds of the decision,144 the BDR determination provides 
only the brute conclusion denying that the care is medically necessary.  
Moreover, the BDR decision-makers include claims personnel whose 
participation would be precluded under the APA.145 
Mr. Jassek challenged WSI’s binding dispute resolution determination 
that a hook device was a sufficient prosthetic device for his amputated left 
hand, rather than the state of the art myoelectric devices, such as provided 
to our nation’s military.  As to the merits, WSI hired an IME examiner who 
determined that since his job exposed him to grease, the myoelectric device 
was not the most cost-effective.146  However, the IME examiner did not 
take into account Mr. Jassek’s whole life and the recommendation and plea 
of his medical provider: “if I lost my hand in a work place accident . . . I hope 
that I would be offered the chance that would give me the best [device].”147  
 
142.  2013 ND 69, 830 N.W.2d 582. 
 143.  The court has held that although an agency deciding adjudicative facts is acting in a 
quasi-judicial capacity, the minimal due process that must be afforded participants are not 
necessarily synonymous with minimal requirements in a court of law.  First Am. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W.2d 509, 514 (N.D. 1974).  Rather, the court, in Steele v. North Dakota 
Worker’s Compensation Bureau, quoted the Eldridge three part balancing test to determine the 
nature of the process due:  (1) the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s 
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedural requirement 
would entail. 273 N.W.2d 692, 699 (N.D. 1978) (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
341-43 (1976)).  
144.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-39 (2013). The court has also said that: 
WSI has the responsibility to weigh the credibility of medical evidence and resolve 
conflicting medical opinions . . . [T]he authority to reject medical evidence selectively 
does not permit WSI to pick and choose in an unreasoned manner. WSI must consider 
the entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for 
disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant. 
Huwe v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 47, ¶ 10, 746 N.W.2d 158, 161-62. 
145.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-37, 38 (2013).  
146.  Excessive concern about cost by the very agency deciding benefits has long troubled 
the courts.  A Louisiana court acknowledged that “some of the policy considerations raised in 
[claimant’s] brief, notably that case managers work for the compensation carrier and thus are 
motivated to reduce medical expenses.”  Reed v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 8 So.3d 824, 829 (La. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
147.  See Brief for Appellant at ¶ 21, Jassek v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69, 
830 N.W.2d 582. 
             
2013] BROKEN PROMISE 639 
The U.S. military provides hundreds of soldiers with state of the art 
myoelectric prosthesis, and it is difficult to understand why WSI should not 
be compelled to restore a more useful hand than a hook to injured 
employees.  Sadly, despite the devastating injury of the loss of a hand at 
work, Mr. Jassek was not given an in-person hearing.  He and other 
similarly situated persons are not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, and 
he did not have an independent tribunal. 
Echoing Eldridge balancing,148 Judge Friendly argued that agencies 
should be allowed to experiment with various procedural rules to guarantee 
due process, contending that perhaps some of the formal rules as right to 
cross examine may be relaxed if the decision maker is truly independent.149  
As we engage in Eldridge balancing, it is important to keep in mind the 
standards set by the United States Supreme Court for evidentiary hearings, 
which include: 
(1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the 
proposed termination; (2) an effective opportunity for the recipient 
to defend by confronting any adverse witness and by presenting 
his own arguments and evidence orally; (3) retain counsel if 
desired; (4) an impartial decision-making; (5) a decision resting 
solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing; and 
(6) a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied 
on.150 
However, the procedures required must be flexible, and recognize that 
all medical necessity questions are not equal.  It is one thing to afford little 
process for a claim for an additional chiropractic treatment and another to 
give a man a hook instead of a myoelectric hand.  The Whedbee court’s 
concern that “if all managed care decisions merited a trial-type process, the 
increased administrative costs would be too great to justify the perceived 
benefit of the hearings”151 is misplaced because the extent of the procedural 
protection provided should be closely tied to the nature of the medical care 
sought.  Additionally, the court overlooked that attorney’s fees are both 
 
148.  Eldridge balancing applies to questions of adjudicative fact, not in regulatory matters 
(where legislative facts are at issue).  In the latter case, a trial-type hearing is not available because 
even though the private interests affected may be high, the value of additional safeguards is 
considered to be minimal, given that the agency weighs the legislative facts of the regulated 
industry as a whole.  II RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 813-15 (5th ed. 2010).  
149.  Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (1975). 
150.  Steele v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 700 n.4 (N.D. 1975). 
151.  Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2014 ND 29, ¶ 12, 845 N.W.2d 632, 
636. 
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contingent on prevailing and limited to 20% of the value of the award.152  
There is no risk that WSI will be flooded with utilization review hearings. 
1. WSI’s BDR does not Employ an Independent Decision-Maker 
and is Opaque to Meaningful Judicial Review 
To the layperson, the most disturbing aspect of administrative law is 
that the decision-maker is the agency that decided against him; indeed, the 
very individuals involved in the investigation may have also acted as the 
hearing officers.  Under criteria adopted by the APA, an individual who had 
served as “investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the investigatory or 
prehearing stage of an adjudicative proceeding [may not] serve as hearing 
officer.”153  Such standard provisions in Administrative Agencies Practice 
Acts “supplement” the “due process requirement of a neutral 
decisionmaker.”154  Clearly, if North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32 
were applicable, the BDR decision maker (the BDR Director, the Medical 
Director and the Claims Adjuster or supervisor) could not act as both the 
investigators and hearing officers nor, as hearing officers, engage in the ex-
parte contacts with WSI’s claims department.  WSI’s BDR is far from the 
unbiased Tribunal required by due process. 
In fact, “[s]cholars and judges consistently characterize provision of a 
neutral decision maker as one of the three or four core requirements of a 
system of fair adjudicatory decision making.”155  In the eyes of the 
claimant, prior participation constitutes bias.156  Distrust of a bureaucracy 
that appears intent on denying and disputing entitlement is normal human 
reaction, and Judge Friendly wisely notes that this “is surely one reason for 
the clamor for adversary proceedings in the United States.”157  Judge 
Friendly is prescient as he observes that ensuring impartiality with “less 
reliance on the bureaucracy for decision making” might best address the 
issue.158  A neutral decision maker that might lessen the need for the full 
panoply of procedural protections is one “with no connection with the 
agency . . . .”159 
Clearly, the procedural safeguards typical of a trial-type hearing are 
especially important when the tribunal is the agency rather than an 
 
152.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (2013). 
153.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-38(1) (2013). 
154.  II PIERCE, supra note 148, at 846. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Friendly, supra note 149, at 1279. 
157.  Id. at 1279-80. 
158.  Id. at 1280. 
159.  Id. at 1289. 
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independent ALJ.  The combination of a BDR Tribunal composed of WSI 
employees, without any procedural protections such as right to counsel, 
right to testify, to cross-examine and rebut, is extremely troubling.  From 
what it appears, WSI employees have not proven to be wholly impartial 
decision makers. 
The appearance of impropriety is high, which is compounded by WSI’s 
failure to provide adequate procedural protections, or to even address the 
evidence favorable to the employee in the BDR decision.  Because the 
courts will review any decision under the extremely deferential abuse of 
discretion standard, the failure to set out detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law makes a mockery of the employee’s right to judicial 
review. 
2. The BDR Does Not Allow Cross-Examination  
and an In-Person Hearing 
North Dakota law is also deficient because those subject to BDR are 
given a paper-only review and are not afforded opportunity to meet the 
decision makers to present the claim in person.  Judge Friendly notes that 
few administrative schemes are disposed to deny the right to call 
witnesses.160  The ability to present a case in one’s own way is fundamental 
to human engagement.  Most injured employees seeking a usable prosthetic 
or surgical cure will especially appreciate the opportunity to testify in-
person, face to face. 
The right to present a case in his or her own way is fundamental to fair 
process.  Those practitioners in this area of law know the impact of a formal 
hearing where we meet the actual human being referred to bloodlessly in 
the records: minds change during the course of those hearings.  The right to 
appear is rooted in the same fundamental human nature that compels us to 
seek face-to-face encounters with adversaries or wielders of power or 
money.161 
The court has stated that the aggrieved party should normally “be 
entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal 
evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of 
adjudicative facts.”162  Professor Larson agrees with Professors Pierce and 
Davis about the need for formal hearings when adjudicating a workers’ 
entitlement to compensation under state law, stating: 
 
160.  Friendly, supra note 149, at 1282. 
161.  See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-18 (1988) (noting the core of the right to a fair 
trial involves the right for the aggrieved to be present in person). 
162.  Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Dorgan, 225 N.W.2d 278, 281 (N.D. 1974) (quoting 
KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 412 (1958)). 
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Fair play rules include the right of cross-examination, rules against 
ex-parte statements, necessity of having all evidence on the record, 
and restrictions on determinations made by independent 
investigation conducted by the tribunal.  These rules are based on 
fundamental notions of fairness.  Nothing is more repugnant to our 
traditions of justice than to be at the mercy of witnesses one cannot 
see or challenge, or to have one’s rights stand or fall on the basis 
of unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted.163 
While the nature of workers’ compensation proceedings “justify some 
relaxation of strict rules of evidence”—e.g., medical records and physician 
letters are normally admitted into evidence in compensation hearings— 
“nevertheless it is fundamental that the right to confront witnesses, to cross-
examine them, to refute them, and to have a record of their testimony must 
be accorded unless waived.”164  These rules, “such as the right to cross-
examine, are designed to guarantee the substantial rights of the parties and 
are based on fundamental notions of fairness.”165  Wigmore has 
characterized cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”166  Consistent with Judge 
Friendly’s observation that while cross-examination can be overrated,167 
nevertheless, cross-examination can be useful to elicit the IME examiner’s 
assumptions that may not be based on the actual history.  The Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Rules of Evidence stated that cross-examination 
has become a “vital feature” of our system “in exposing imperfections of 
perception, memory, and narration . . . .”168 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that where the important 
property right in workers’ compensation benefits is at stake, claimants have 
the right to cross-examine, at WSI’s expense, medical experts “whose 
opinions [WSI] uses to refute the claimant’s treating physicians.”169  The 
court observed that when WSI obtains an IME to refute the treating 
physician, and refuses cross-examination, “it effectively denies most 
claimants a real opportunity to prove their entitlement to benefits.  If [the 
APA] is read to permit such a procedure, a potential due process violation 
may exist.”170 
 
163.  7 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.11[3][a]. 
164.  Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 31 (Del. 1995). 
165.  Id. at 32. 
166.  2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW 1697-98 (1904). 
167.  See Friendly, supra note 149, at 1284-85. 
168.  FED. R. EVID. art. VII introductory note. 
169.  Froysland v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 432 N.W.2d 883, 889 (N.D. 1988). 
170.  Id.   
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As the North Dakota Supreme Court recognizes and Professor Larson 
advocates, the Montana Supreme Court also held that fair play rules of due 
process apply in workers’ compensation matters and “include the right of 
cross-examination.”171  Moreover, the court quoted Professor Larson’s 
similar heartfelt concern about the “increasingly common practice of 
referral of claimant to an official medical examiner or an independent 
physician chosen by the commission,” which made it “particularly 
important that commissions not lose sight of the elementary requirement 
that the parties be given an opportunity to see such a doctor’s report, cross-
examine him, and if necessary provide rebuttal testimony.”172  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court was equally concerned about IMEs, 
construing a statute that gave prima facie status to the report of the IME as 
potentially facially unconstitutional unless construed to allow rebuttal and 
cross-examination.173  The court noted that the statute authorized the ALJ to 
order “the submission of additional medical testimony” and provided “an 
opportunity for the claimant to put before the relevant decision makers 
medical testimony she considers favorable to her claim,” and to cross-
examine the IME examiner.174  As noted below however, WSI’s trial by 
IME (whereby the treating doctor is not also deposed) has morphed this into 
a WSI advantage—the IME is given the sole and final word.  There seems 
to be little question that a dispute resolution mechanism devoid of any of 
the various protections to a fair process violates the Constitution. 
C. DUCKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION—IMPROPERLY 
INVOKING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
The Jassek court, however, avoided the constitutional question, 
deciding instead that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, 
because his medical provider has signed Jassek’s request for review.175  The 
court reached this conclusion on its own, as the issue was never raised by 
the parties, and even though WSI had agreed the request had been filed “for 
 
171.  Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, 530 P.2d 433, 436-37 (Mont. 1975) (quoting 7 
LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.05[4]). 
172.  Id.  (quoting 7 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.05[4]).  See also Baros v. Wyoming, 
834 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Wyo. 1992) (recognizing “the majority rule that medical reports in a written 
form are admissible so long as the elementary fair-play requirements of notice, timely furnishing 
of copies, and the right of cross-examination if requested, are observed.”). 
173.  O’Brien’s Case, 673 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Mass. 1996). 
174.  Id. at 570-71. 
175.  Jassek v. N.D. Workforrce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69, ¶¶ 6-8, 830 N.W.2d 582, 584-
85. 
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Michael Jassek” and which WSI considered “their BDR request.”176  Jassek 
was pro se at that point and relied upon WSI’s representation that he was 
party to the appeal.  Citing Carroll v North Dakota Workforce Safety & 
Insurance,177—a case in which the employee had not filed a timely 
appeal178—the court dismissed Jassek’s appeal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because he had not personally signed the review petition.179   
Jassek is out of step with the governing statutes and cases decided by 
the court in other matters, such as probate.  North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-32-01(8) defines a party as “each person named or admitted as a 
party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a 
party.”180  Whether an individual is party to the BDR depends on more than 
the accident as to who files the BDR petition.  WSI was correct that given 
its representations, Jassek was a party to the BDR under the law and that 
Jassek, as the aggrieved party, was properly party to the appeal under North 
Dakota Century Code section 65-02-20. 
While courts have sometimes characterized a failure to satisfy certain 
procedural requirements before filing suit or taking of an appeal as lacking 
subject matter jurisdiction, many legal scholars, such as the renowned 
Professor Robert J. Martineau,181 have joined Professor Larson in criticizing 
the lax use of the concept.182  Professor Martineau notes that while courts 
have little difficulty in agreeing on an abstract definition of subject matter 
jurisdiction, “the difficulty comes when appellate courts apply the 
definition or, ignoring the definition, characterize other defects in the 
proceeding as the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in order to permit a 
belated attack.”183  For example, Professor Martineau explores Mesolella v. 
City of Providence,184 wherein the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
 
176.  Brief for Appellee at ¶ 20, Jassek v. N.D.  Workforce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69, 830 
N.W.2d 582  (emphasis added) (“Therefore, WSI did consider Jassek to be a party to and a 
participant in the request for binding dispute resolution.”). 
177.  2008 ND 139, 752 N.W.2d 188. 
178.  Jassek, ¶ 11, 830 N.W.2d at 585. 
179.  Id. ¶¶ 8-11.   
180.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-32-01(8) (2013) (emphasis added). 
181.  Professor Martineau, a Distinguished Research Professor of Law at the University of 
Cincinnati, is the author of two casebooks on appellate practice. 
182.  See Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal: 
Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).  As Professor Martineau argues, 
“[a]llowing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to be raised for the first time on appeal has 
enormous implications for the parties to a legal proceeding, the trial and appellate courts, and the 
proper functioning of a judicial system.”  Id.  Professor Martineau notes that cases can be litigated 
for years, and if subject matter jurisdiction may be first raised on appeal to the supreme court, “the 
waste of private and public resources is enormous.”  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. at 8 (discussing Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 666 (R.I. 1986)). 
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distinguished between procedural requirements for filing an action and 
subject matter jurisdiction,185 as courts often “confused the lack of 
jurisdiction over a particular action for failure to comply with the conditions 
precedent with a lack of jurisdiction over the class of cases to which that 
action belongs.”186 
The real question posed in Jassek was not one of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  According to Professor Martineau, “procedural obligations 
placed on a party to initiate an action . . . should not be treated as a 
limitation on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”187  Martineau explains 
that subject matter jurisdiction goes to the type of case the court can hear, 
not what a party must do to invoke it.  This should not be confused with the 
procedural obligations, for “if this were not the case, the anomalous 
situation would be created in which subject matter jurisdiction would be 
dependent upon the actions of a party, exactly the opposite of the principle 
that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties.” 188 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held 
that a jurisdictional error failing to join the United States as a party did not 
make the judgment void.189  Since the issue in Jassek was not a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the issue regarding the procedural obligation of 
the party to initiate the action should not have been allowed to be raised for 
the first time on appeal.  There is no question but that as to subject matter 
jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction over this “class of case”—BDR 
disputes.190  Hopefully, Mr. Jassek will be the last pro se injured worker 
denied his day in court by the erroneous use of subject matter jurisdiction. 
IV.  DISABILITY 
Disability is defined as the loss of earnings capacity—the inability to 
obtain or perform employment due to injury.191  There are different 
 
185.  Id. 
186.  The Mesolella court noted the confusing use of the word jurisdictional, holding that 
failure to comply with a procedural notice requirement does not divest a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Mesolella, 508 A.2d at 665.  Because the lack of proper notice defense does not go 
to subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be raised belatedly. Id.  
187.  Martineau, supra note 182, at 23. 
188.  Id. at 23-24. 
189.  Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 824, 825 (8th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980). 
190.  See Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d 369, 378 (the court had 
subject matter jurisdiction because it “had the power to hear and determine the general subject 
involved in the action”) (emphasis added)). 
191.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (2013).  See also Rodenbiker v. Workforce Safety 
and Ins., 2007 ND 169, ¶ 18, 740 N.W.2d 831, 835 (defining disability as the inability to “perform 
or obtain any substantial amount of labor in his particular line of work, or in any other for which 
he would be fitted.”) (emphasis added).  
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eligibility standards for disability on initial application, and on reapplication 
for disability benefits.192  As argued in subsection A below, North Dakota 
law is profoundly mistaken in determining eligibility for disability benefits 
on reapplication, which has recently been applied to end disability 
eligibility to disabled prisoners on release.  Part B discusses employer 
transitional job offers that are often a subterfuge to end disability benefits.  
Part C argues that the vocational rehabilitation chapter to determine post 
injury earnings capacity has devolved to a termination statute, given WSI’s 
continued use of one size fits all vocational plans for return to work in the 
same generic jobs.  Part D discusses the inability of many workers to 
remain in compliance with onerous work search for entry level jobs they are 
not interested in, have no aptitude or skills for, and are unlikely to obtain, 
resulting in benefit termination for noncompliance.  Part E sets out the 
plight of the elderly disabled, many of whom are reduced to penury in their 
golden years by various retirement offsets.  Part F addresses the simple 
need for the employee to prove a causal relationship between injury and 
disability and WSI’s refusal to apply prior precedent of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court. 
A. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF 
ACTUAL WAGE LOSS IN DETERMINING DISABILITY ON 
REAPPLICATION IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH BASIC  
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES 
Claimant’s attorneys have long been troubled by the harsh construction 
of the reapplication statute, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-
08(1), which requires proof of a “significant change in the compensable 
medical condition” and “actual wage loss,” prior to reinstatement of 
disability benefits.193  The 2013 Legislature demonstrated a basic 
misunderstanding of workers’ compensation law in a “housekeeping bill,” 
applying the reapplication statute to inmates so as to effectively preclude 
disabled inmates from entitlement to disability benefits on release from 
incarceration.194  Prior to the amendments, North Dakota Century Code 
section 65-05-08(2) provided that disability benefits must be suspended 
during the period of incarceration but must also be reinstated upon release if 
 
192.  If disability benefits are paid and discontinued, additional disability benefits may be 
paid on reapplication only on proof that the employee has sustained:  (a) a significant change in 
the compensable medical condition; (b) actual wage loss; and (c) the employee has not withdrawn 
from the job market.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013). 
193.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013). 
194.  H.B. 1080 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). 
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otherwise entitled.195  The crafty amendments are disguised to look as 
though there is no substantive change, providing that “[a]ll payments of 
disability and rehabilitation benefits of any employee who is eligible for, or 
receiving, benefits under this title must be discontinued when the employee 
is confined . . . in excess of hundred and eighty consecutive days.”196  WSI 
characterized the bill as housekeeping, and did not explain the effect.197   
To understand the effect of the legislation, one must understand that a 
much harsher standard for entitlement to disability applies in an application 
for reinstatement after benefits had been discontinued under the 
reapplication statute, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1).198  
 
195.  This provision formerly provided that payments of disability and rehabilitation must be 
suspended during the period of confinement over seventy hours, but reinstated if the disability 
remained at the time of release from incarceration.  N.D. Cent. Code § 65-05-08(2) (2011). 
196.  H.B. 1080 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (emphasis added). 
197.  See Hearing on H.B. 1080 Before the S. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63d Leg. 
Sess., Reg. Assemb. 17 (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Tim Wahlin) (confirming Senator Klein’s 
indication that “this is the annual WSI cleanup bill.”).  WSI counsel, Jodi Bjornson, provided a 
written explanation of section five in her January 14, 2013 handout that does not reveal the effect 
of the amendment on the incarcerated:   
Section 5.  This section of the bill proposes to change how disability benefits are 
restarted after an injured employee is released from incarceration.  Currently, if an 
injured employee who is receiving disability benefits becomes incarcerated for more 
than seventy-two consecutive hours, disability benefits are suspended.  Upon release, 
the disability benefits are immediately reinstated regardless of the length of 
incarceration.  So, for example, if an injured employee has been in the penitentiary for 
ten years, their disability benefits restart as soon as they are let out without any 
explanation or reapplication process.  The proposed change would create a tiered 
process so that if an injured employee is jailed for a period between seventy-two 
consecutive hours and thirty consecutive days, disability benefits would be 
immediately restarted.  But, if an injured employee spends more than thirty 
consecutive days in jail, he or she would be required to reapply just as any other 
injured worker, before receiving disability benefits again. 
Id. at 42 (written testimony of Jodi Bjornson) (emphasis added).  At the February 19, 2013 
hearing, it was pointed out that the legislation would make it impossible for those incarcerated to 
be eligible for reinstatement.  See id. at 19 (testimony of Dean Haas).  In reply, Ms. Bjornson said 
that under the case law, an injured worker who shows that a good faith work search failed due to 
injury might be entitled to reinstatement of disability.  Id. at 20 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson).  This 
is false; the court has precluded this argument.  See, e.g., Johnson v. N.D. Workforce Safety & 
Ins., 2010 ND 198, ¶ 20, 789 N.W.2d 565, 570.  WSI also left the impression with the Legislature 
that an individual incarcerated for a lengthy period—its example was ten years—was, absent the 
sought for amendment to the law, automatically entitled to immediate reinstatement on release. 
See id. at 42 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson).  This is also untrue.  Disability benefits are always 
conditioned on the claimant’s medical status, and if the inmate had recovered in this ten-year 
period, no disability would be paid.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08.1 (2013) (requiring a 
claimant to submit medical verification of disability).  Furthermore, WSI has continuing 
jurisdiction to determine disability status on the merits. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-04 (2013).  
Thus, none of the purported justifications for the amendment are real.  Punishing prisoners a 
second time by precluding reinstatement of disability on release from prison is poor public policy.  
198.  This section provides that once disability benefits are “discontinued,” WSI may 
reinstate disability only upon written reapplication by the employee, with proof that the employee 
sustained a significant change in the compensable medical condition and actual wage loss caused 
             
648 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:611 
H.B. 1080 requires employees whose disability benefits are discontinued 
upon incarceration to reapply for benefits under North Dakota Century 
Code section 65-05-08(1).  WSI testified before the Legislature that those 
employees whose benefits were previously suspended upon incarceration 
should not be automatically placed back on disability on release from jail, 
but should be required to “re-apply like everyone else.”199  WSI did not tell 
the Legislature that the change in language brings into play the 
reapplication statute, and did not explain the significant difference between 
initial applications for disability, and reapplications under North Dakota 
Century Code section 65-05-08(1), which requires not only a “significant 
change in the compensable medical condition,” but also “actual wage 
loss.”200 
Unlike most employees whose benefits are discontinued, those whose 
benefits are suspended upon incarceration were not released for work, for if 
they had been, disability would have terminated on the merits.  These 
individuals are sentenced to incarceration while still disabled.  So, on 
release, it is almost impossible to show a change in medical condition.  
How does one prove that a disabling condition is even more disabling?  
And what would be the point? Either one is disabled, or not.201 
Most crucially, the reapplication statute requires proof of “actual wage 
loss.”  While WSI intimated to the Legislature that actual wage loss might 
be shown by an unsuccessful job search, the court has made it clear that 
“actual wage loss” requires proof of loss of wage income from a job 
actually held by the employee contemporaneously with the change in 
condition.202  Loss of an actual job should not be required to prove 
disability.  After all, disability is defined as the inability to “perform or 
obtain any substantial amount of labor in his particular line of work, or in 
 
by the significant change in the compensable medical condition. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) 
(2013). 
199.  See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 42 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson); id. at 23 
(testimony of Bryan Klipfel) (explaining that “the reason they looked at changing the law was a 
fairness issue.  If you are incarcerated for a long period of time and all you have to do is come out 
an reapply for your benefits, where if it is anybody else with discontinuance of their benefits they 
have to go through the reapplication process.”).  
200.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013). 
201.  Contrary to any concern that a disability might be cured while the individual is 
incarcerated, a simple release from incarceration does not result in automatic reinstatement on 
release without any examination of the merits.  Reinstatement of disability to those released from 
incarceration would be determined as is any initial claim for disability.  If the disability ends, so 
do payments.  So, if an employee released from jail improves so as to be able to work, WSI can 
terminate disability benefits on the merits; after all, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-04 
grants WSI continuing jurisdiction to determine disability status. H.B. 1080 was not needed to 
accomplish this sensible result.  
202.  See Gronfur v. N.D. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 ND 42, ¶¶ 14-15, 658 N.W.2d 337, 
343.  
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any other for which he would be fitted,”203 and so measures loss of earnings 
capacity.  Unfortunately, this is not the rule in reapplications.  It should be. 
The court’s interpretation of the reapplication statute is little understood, 
and its harsh consequences long ignored. H.B. 1080 provided an 
opportunity to revisit this issue, which the Legislature, with the obfuscation 
of WSI, declined to take.  The issue deserves much more attention than it 
has received. 
The reapplication statute was introduced due to the difficulty of closing 
disability claims, which occurs for many reasons.  First, after Buechler v. 
North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau204 was decided, the 
schedule award for a permanent partial disability then governed by the now 
repealed North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-12 could no longer be 
used to close partial disability claims.205  The Buechler court interpreted the 
permanent partial disability award as an add-on benefit to compensate for 
“impairment.”206  Schedule awards had been serving as prima facie 
evidence of the partial disability (loss of earnings capacity).  In other 
words, the schedule award under North Dakota Century Code section 65-
05-12 for partial disability (not total disability) had allowed claims closure 
based on a presumed wage loss element.207  The Legislature subsequently 
 
203.  Jimison v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822, 827 (N.D. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
204.  222 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1974). 
205.  Permanent partial disability schedule awards are based on medical condition after 
maximum medical improvement and while paid without regard to proof of wage loss, yet were 
based on wage loss principles, as they were intended as presumptive evidence of wage loss.  4 
LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.04.  This meant that an employee, for example, who lost an eye, but 
was able to return to work at his or her regular wage is nevertheless entitled to the schedule 
permanent partial disability award.  Id.  But this cuts both ways.  “Conversely, if the workers’ 
[schedule] benefits expire, and he or she remains [unable to work] because of disability,” the 
benefits still stop when the scheduled number of weeks runs out. Id. at § 80.05[4].  The North 
Dakota permanent partial disability schedule award had been serving this basic purpose, and 
allowed for claims closure.  Larson went on to explain that the wage loss principle became 
gradually distorted, observing that “[w]hen a system, all of whose features are keyed to a wage-
loss function, is changed, whether absentmindedly or deliberately, into a physical impairment 
system, with no corresponding adjustment of these wage-loss-related features, there is bound to be 
trouble.”  Id. at § 80.05[3].  
206.  Buechler, 222 N.W.2d at 861.  Larson notes that several states came to embrace the 
physical impairment theory under which schedule awards are always add-on awards, and never 
used as presumptive evidence of earnings loss to close a disability claim. Minnesota accomplished 
this by statute in 1974.  4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.05[7].  “In addition, several states have 
judicially broken ranks.  North Dakota was the first, holding in 1974 that both a permanent total 
and a permanent partial (‘22% disability of the whole man’) award could be made for the same 
back injury—a result that can only be explained by assuming it to be based on a theory that the 
former is for loss of earning capacity and the latter for physical impairment.” Id.   
207.  Of the Buechler opinion, Larson notes:  
It is significant that the court, apart from a couple of generalizations, was unable to 
cite a single case from another jurisdiction reaching the same result, although the 
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amended North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-12 to refer to 
impairment, and these awards were no longer a schedule injury for 
presumed wage loss.208 
The second reason that claims became more difficult to close is an 
equally involved story.  The agency had also been operating under a 
profound misunderstanding of the effect of a simple discontinuation of 
disability benefits, believing that any work release and termination of 
disability benefits was final, and could not be reopened.  For example, an 
employee might be released to heavy work, and benefits discontinued.  
Later, the employee might have a change in condition and be given a light 
work release only.  If the employee had skills only to do heavy work, he or 
she might now be unable to work.  Yet, WSI was claiming that disability 
could not be reopened. WSI claimed that reopening was purely 
discretionary, and its earlier determination of disability was res judicata. 
The agency relied on Jones v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation 
Bureau209 for the proposition that once it discontinued benefits the 
disability determination became final.  But that case is inapposite because 
Jones did not involve disability, which can change over time.  Rather, Jones 
had to do with the causal relationship between the injury and the 
condition.210  A decision on cause is something that can be—and should 
be—finally decided and not continually reopened. 
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply with equal force to 
disability determinations because the ability to work can change over time.  
A WSI decision is res judicata as to the worker’s disability status as it then 
exists.  The court in Lass v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation 
Bureau211 observed that disability determinations must be reconsidered 
based on change in condition.  This, the court said “is a recognition of the 
obvious fact that, no matter how competent a commission’s diagnosis of 
claimant’s condition and earning prospects at the time of hearing may be, 
that condition may later change markedly for the worse, or may improve, or 
may even clear up altogether.”212 
With the questionable end of claims closure under Buechler, but the 
spot-on Lass holding, WSI lost the ability to close disability claims.  
 
North Dakota statute is of a routine type, and although the combination of permanent 
total and permanent partial occurs thousands of times every year. 
Id. at § 80.05[7] n.63. 
208.  See Kroeplin v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (N.D. 
1987). 
209.  334 N.W.2d 188, 191 (N.D. 1983). 
210.  Id. at 189. 
211.  415 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1987). 
212.  Id. at 800 (quoting 3 LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.10 (1983)). 
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Adjusters at the time of the Lass decision called these re-openings “vault 
crawlers” because a claim with no activity and stored in the vault might be 
reactivated by a claimant who provided medical records showing disability, 
often dating back months or even years.  Clearly, something had to be done.  
WSI submitted legislation to enact the reapplication criteria in North 
Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1) and also a new invention, the 
vocational rehabilitation chapter, North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-
05.1, largely modeled on the Montana Act.213  The rehabilitation statutes 
also allow for claims closure, based on a retained earnings capacity. 
Because there was no procedure to limit vault crawling, some form of 
reapplication procedure was clearly needed.  Primarily, the employee would 
have to prove his medical condition changed, and that due to this change, he 
or she had lost a significant ability to earn an income from work.  But the 
Gronfur court’s interpretation of the meaning of “actual wage loss” as loss 
of actual wage income was not expected, as it is contrary to the very 
definition of disability, which is loss of earnings capacity.214 
The Bureau’s initial view (for the first 10 years after the statute was 
enacted) was that the term “actual wage loss” meant what the dissent in 
Gronfur claims:  that the inability to obtain employment due to injury is 
sufficient to show loss of his or her ability to work for a living.215  The 
words “actual wage loss” do not have the talismanic significance the North 
Dakota Supreme Court gave them in Gronfur and its progeny.216  
Employees have actually lost income if their injury alone precludes them 
from obtaining or performing employment.  The court does not appear to 
express any surprise that this trio of cases first raised this issue over ten 
years after enactment, nor does the record appear to reflect WSI’s altered 
construction of the statute. 
 
213.  See MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 59-71 (2013).  The Montana Supreme Court has noted that 
the rehabilitation chapter is intended to return employees to work and assist them “in acquiring 
skills or aptitudes to return to work” to “reasonably reduce the worker’s actual wage loss.”  
Caldwell v. MACo Workers Comp. Trust, 256 P.3d 923, 928 (Mont. 2011) (emphasis added).  
Just as North Dakota utilized the term “actual wage loss” in North Dakota Century Code section 
65-05-08(1) to determine eligibility for disability on reapplication, Montana used “actual wage 
loss” to determine eligibility for vocational rehabilitation.  Obviously, Montana got it right in not 
requiring loss of an actual job to qualify for rehabilitation.  Rather, Montana law defines “actual 
wage loss” as “wages a worker earns or is qualified to earn after the worker reaches maximum 
healing are less than the actual wages the worker received at the time of the injury.”  MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 39-71-116 (2013).  Clearly, Montana recognizes that “actual wage loss” means loss of 
earnings capacity.  That the North Dakota vocational rehabilitation was based on Montana law is 
also highly persuasive that the Gronfur court got it wrong.   
214.  See Gronfur v. N.D. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 ND 42, ¶¶ 14-15, 658 N.W.2d 337, 
345.   
215.  Id. ¶¶ 17-21, 658 N.W.2d at 343-44 (Maring J., dissenting). 
216.  See Bachmeier v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 63, ¶ 16, 660 N.W.2d 217, 
222; Lesmeister v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 60, ¶ 24, 659 N.W.2d 350, 358. 
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To recap, the Gronfur court upheld the denial of disability despite the 
undisputed nature of the disability that accompanied Mr. Gronfur’s 
surgery,217 simply because the legislature used the term “actual wage loss” 
in North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b), rather than the more 
expansive term “earnings capacity.”218  This proved to the court that if a 
worker was not actually working prior to filing the reapplication, no 
benefits could be paid.219  The court thereby reverses the basic principle in 
Lass that since disability may change over time, prior determinations should 
not bind future decision-makers on new facts regarding disability status. 
Moreover Gronfur is premised on a misunderstanding of basic 
compensation principles.  The court, quoting Professor Larson, noted 
Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing 
actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the 
injury.  It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison 
are not quite the same.  Actual earnings are a relatively concrete 
quantity . . . .  Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical 
concept.  It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the 
legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury 
earnings factor.220 
This is absolutely true.  The court fails to note the most crucial fact:  
that actual wage income is used to calculate and determine the initial 
disability award—which is two-thirds of the employee’s actual wages at the 
date of injury.221  Actual wages determine the weekly compensation rate.  
On the other hand, “earnings capacity” is used to ascertain whether the 
employee lost or retains the ability to earn a living post injury:  thus, no 
state other than North Dakota—and even then only in reapplication 
scenarios222—uses actual wages earned post injury to forever determine loss 
 
217.  An examination of the facts in Gronfur is enlightening.  Gronfur injured his back in 
1996 and received disability benefits for a short time. Gronfour, ¶ 2, 658 N.W.2d at 339.  In 1997, 
the Bureau terminated total disability benefits but awarded temporary disability benefits, claiming 
he could do light work.  Id.  He did not appeal, and the order became final.  Id.  He reapplied in 
2000, claiming that his back condition had worsened. Id. ¶ 3.  In fact, Gronfur had back surgery, 
which was, as a matter of medical fact, disabling.  Id.  The Bureau denied his reapplication 
because he had not established “actual wage loss.”  Id. at 340.  In fact, Gronfur had not worked 
since 1996. Id.  
218.  Id. ¶ 3, 658 N.W.2d at 342-43. 
219.  Id. ¶ 15, 658 N.W.2d at 343. 
220.  Id. ¶ 13, 658 N.W.2d at 342 (quoting 4 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPESNATION LAW § 
81.01). 
221.  4 Larson, supra note 7, at § 81.01[1].  As to the calculation to determine the 
employee’s actual wage at the time of injury on which to base benefits, see id. at §§ 93.01-93.06.  
222.  Other than in reapplications, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-10 conditions 
partial disability awards on loss of “wage-earning capacity.”  Generally, “[t]he employee’s 
earnings capacity may be established by expert vocational evidence of a capacity to earn in the 
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of this earnings capacity.223  The Legislature’s skepticism that post injury 
actual wage income truly reflects the loss of earnings capacity is starkly 
illustrated by North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1.  There, the 
Legislature created a “waste basket” presumption that the employee retains 
some earning capacity to reduce entitlement to total disability even when 
none of the priority options in North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1 
apply.224  Actual wage income is not generally used to determine 
entitlement to partial disability after the employee finishes vocational 
training either; rather benefits are paid based upon the difference between 
pre-injury actual wage income and the higher of the actual post injury 
earnings or “the employee’s wage-earning capacity” after vocational 
retraining is completed.225 
The Gronfur court’s cite to Larson’s Workers Compensation treatise as 
supportive is incorrect, as the quote is taken out of context.  Larson shows 
that the difference between use of the terms “actual wages” and “earnings 
capacity” is because the former is used only to determine pre-injury wage 
basis and the latter to determine post injury income loss.  Professor Larson 
explains why it is important to focus on the more expansive concept of 
“earnings capacity” post-injury: 
In essence, the problem is one of tying earnings to a period of 
time.  The relevant period of time for prior earnings can be made 
relatively short and definite, such as the six months [or one year] 
preceding the accident.  Once an arbitrary past period is specified 
as setting the basis for computing an average weekly wage, there 
can be little argument about what wages were in fact earned.  But 
the relevant period for post-injury earnings melts away into the 
indefinite future.  Obviously we cannot take an arbitrary period of, 
say, six months after the injury as conclusive, since for a multitude 
of reasons that period might be entirely nonrepresentative.  On the 
 
statewide job pool where the worker lives.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(3) (2013).  While 
actual post injury earnings are presumptive evidence of earnings capacity, this is strictly limited to 
circumstances where the employee found full time work and in a job related to the employee’s 
transferable skills.  Id.  Moreover, the presumption to use actual wage income is rebuttable.  Also 
consistent with the emphasis on earnings capacity post injury, the vocational rehabilitation 
chapter clearly conditions continuing disability awards and awards of vocational training on loss 
of earnings capacity.  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-04(4) (2013).  There is absolutely no 
compensation principle to justify using anything other than loss of earnings capacity to determine 
an employee’s eligibility for benefits when he or she reapplies due to a significant change in 
medical or vocational circumstance.   
223.  4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 81.07.  
224.  North Dakota law provides that if none of the priority options are viable, the employee 
must continue to seek work or be subject to termination for noncompliance.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 
65-05.1-01(6)(a) (2013). 
225.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-06.1(2)(i)(2) (2013). 
             
654 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:611 
other hand, we cannot wait out the rest of claimant’s life to see 
what his or her average weekly wage loss ultimately turned out to 
be.  The normal solution is to make the best possible estimate of 
future impairment of earnings, on the strength not only of actual 
post-injury earnings but of any other available clues.226 
Clearly, in determining the employee’s lifetime loss of income, the 
employee’s actual post-injury earnings are wholly inadequate in 
determining the lifelong loss of the income stream the worker could have 
earned but for the injury.227  Actual wages are not the measure of this loss; 
loss of earnings capacity is. 
Thus, Larson notes that every Workers Compensation Act focuses on 
the employee’s “retained earnings capacity” rather than actual post-injury 
earnings in determining the disability award (as opposed to pre-injury 
actual wages that set the amount of the weekly disability check).  This focus 
on retained earnings capacity is essential because injured workers 
frequently find themselves at a considerable disadvantage in obtaining 
employment after released to do some kind of work, most often of a kind 
the worker had never performed before, as they go from performing heavy 
labor to light work only.  Since, as the Gronfur Court held, “actual wage 
loss,” means the loss of a job, the State turns its back on injured employees 
whose injury is the primary reason they cannot obtain work. 
The extremely harsh construction of the reapplication statute should be 
ameliorated by allowing an employee eligibility for reopening of disability 
under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(4).  This would still 
require the employee to show not only a change in medical condition, but 
also a diligent work search that was unsuccessful due to the injury.  In other 
words, the employee would have to prove that he or she had not just 
lounged on the couch, but was beating the pavement hard for work, and was 
unable to obtain any employment because of the injury.  WSI counsel’s 
testimony at the hearing on H.B. 1080 indicated that WSI might agree that 
this is a desirable approach.228 
But as is its predilection, WSI did not inform the committee that the 
North Dakota Supreme Court has unfortunately precluded this argument in 
Johnson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance.229 The court’s 
summary dismissal of the argument is superficial and disheartening: 
 
226.  4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 81.01[1]. 
227.  Id. 
228.  See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 2-8 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson). 
229.  2010 ND 198, 789 N.W.2d 565. 
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Johnson argues, however, he was not required to reapply for 
disability benefits under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(1), because he made 
a series of good-faith work trials and was entitled to reinstatement 
of disability benefits and a reassessment of his reasonable options 
for reemployment under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4).  However, 
N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4) falls within the statutory chapter 
addressing vocational rehabilitation services, and applies only after 
there has been a determination of the first appropriate 
rehabilitation option under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(4).  Here 
vocational rehabilitation services were not initiated under 
N.D.C.C. ch. 65-05.1, and WSI did not make a determination of 
Johnson’s first appropriate rehabilitation option.  We therefore 
conclude N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4) does not apply, and we reject 
Johnson’s attempt to circumvent the reapplication requirements 
under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(1) for reinstatement of disability 
benefits.230 
Based on WSI’s representations to the Legislature that an inmate’s 
disability benefits might be resumed “if you can show that you tried to seek 
work and you couldn’t because of your disability,”231 an inmate on release 
must be deemed to have requested rehabilitation services under North 
Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(8)(b).232  This would 
acknowledge that any informed employee would request rehabilitation 
services to meet the Johnson exception so as to allow for reinstatement 
upon proof a good faith work search failed due to injury under North 
Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(4).  In pending litigation however, 
WSI now pretends as though it had not made this representation to the 
legislature, contending that job search evidence is irrelevant and that the 
inmate on release must show a significant change in medical condition and 
actual wage loss, rather than an inability to obtain work evidenced by 
unsuccessful job search.233 
The Legislature should amend the reapplication statute to provide that 
benefits must be reinstated on proof of a significant change in medical 
condition, and “loss of earnings capacity.”  If WSI’s opinions are as they 
 
230.  Id. ¶ 20, 789 N.W.2d at 570. 
231.  See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 20 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson). 
232.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(8) (2013) (allowing either WSI or an employee to 
initiate vocational rehabilitation services).   
233.  In an unreported case, Miller v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance, decided 
by an ALJ on other grounds, WSI rejected the argument that under its representations to the 
Legislature, it must deem the inmate to have requested initiation of vocational services to avoid 
the harsh result in Johnson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance, 2010 ND 198, ¶ 20, 
789 N.W.2d 565 (materials in possession of author). 
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were represented to the Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee as 
the legislature considered H.B. 1080, the agency should support an 
amendment to allow disability benefits on reapplication under North Dakota 
Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b) on proof of loss of earnings 
capacity—as in a failed job search.  Reapplications will still be subject to 
strict criteria of both a substantial change in medical and vocational 
circumstance. 
Unfortunately, as the Legislature ostensibly considered WSI’s bill to 
apply the actual wage loss requirement to prisoners on release from 
incarceration, the committee did not seize the opportunity to understand the 
harsh application of the reapplication statute.  Rather, the Legislature 
granted WSI’s sought amendment to preclude incarcerated employees from 
ever being able to meet the exacting standard for reinstatement of disability 
benefits on release from prison.  Even if there is little sympathy for those 
who offend society by committing a crime, society as whole surely does not 
benefit by adding a punishment under the Workers’ Compensation 
statutes.234  As one commentator persuasively argues, because 
uncompensated injuries contribute to recidivism, society suffers not only 
property and health loss, but also the loss of a future taxpayer.235  And even 
if one ignores the public policy problem of transferring the economic losses 
to other governmental and charitable entities that often cannot fill the void, 
there must be some sympathy for the innocent dependents of the released 
inmate. 
The court’s construction of the reapplication statute is harsh, and 
offends basic workers’ compensation principles.  The interpretation of the 
reapplication statute does not allow reinstatement on the same terms as 
initial applications—the inability to obtain work—but rather requires the 
employee to show he or she had a job at the time of reapplication.  This 
vicious circle precludes the employee from proving disability on re-
application for the very reason that he or she is disabled in the first place—
that the employee could not obtain the job that would have proved the 
actual wage loss.  So, on reapplication these employees find themselves 
confronted with a paradoxical argument: the employee’s very disability that 
WSI seeks to refute serves as a defense to WSI on reapplication. 
 
 
234.  See generally Steven A. Weiler, A Time for Recognition:  Extending Workmen’s 
Compensation Coverage to Inmates, 61 N.D. L. REV. 402 (1985).  
235.  Id. at 421-22.  Weiler argues that five public policy considerations underlie the 
extension of coverage to inmates:  (1) economic; (2) justice and equity; (3) constitutional 
guarantees; (4) reduction of recidivism; and (5) nonfault liability.  Id. at 413.  
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B. EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS AS SUBTERFUGE  
TO TERMINATE DISABILITY 
By requiring the loss of a job to prove actual wage loss on 
reapplication, the court has largely reversed the Lass principle that a prior 
disability determination should not be res judicata if the employee has 
sustained a change in medical and vocational circumstances.236  
Interestingly, while an employee is no longer allowed to prove that his or 
her failure to obtain work despite a good-faith work search constitutes a 
significant change in vocational circumstances (to avoid the prior 
termination of disability being given res judicata effect), an employee fired 
for cause may be entitled to reinstatement.  An employee fired for cause 
need not show actual wage loss, but may instead prove that after the 
termination he made a good faith job search and was unable to obtain work 
due to the work injury.237  It is odd, indeed, that an employee terminated for 
cause has a better opportunity for reinstatement based on a failed job search 
than do blameless employees who suffer a change in medical condition and 
cannot locate work. 
Claimants’ advocates have observed employers coordinating a strategy 
with WSI to terminate disability benefits—leaving most employees 
ineligible for reinstatement.  The common scenario is an employee with a 
heavy work history who is now restricted to light duty only.  If the 
employee’s recovery and release to regular duty appears to be longer than is 
customary to the injury, WSI and the employer are motivated to create a 
transitional or modified job, which from the employee’s view may be 
make-work.  Once the physician confirms a work release, the employee is 
obligated to engage a work trial or benefits are terminated.238  Shortly after 
the transitional job begins, the make-work may end in frustration and 
quitting, or the employer may subsequently fire the employee without 
giving cause.  The employee no longer has wage income, and by virtue of 
disability benefits having been discontinued when the job trial began, 
reinstatement under the reapplication statute becomes very unlikely. 
Individuals coming to North Dakota for these great job opportunities 
may soon find themselves abandoned after an injury occurs when they 
 
236.  While some may argue that the diagnosis must have changed, the change in medical 
condition should be established by a change in the work restrictions.  However, change in 
vocational circumstances should be proved by the inability to obtain work due to injury as 
demonstrated by failure of a good faith work search. 
237.  See Wendt v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 467 N.W. 2d 720, 727-28 (N.D. 1991) 
(holding that a change in vocational circumstances can warrant reopening of the disability claim). 
238.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(7) (2013) (providing a defense to compensation if the 
employee “voluntarily limits income or refuses to accept employment suitable to the employee’s 
capacity, offered to or procured for the employee . . . .”). 
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return home to rehabilitate.  Some cannot find a physician in their home 
state, but all whose disability benefits had been discontinued find that 
reinstatement is nearly impossible because they are unable to locate work 
again to establish actual wage loss.  The brute fact is that many who come 
here have a history of heavy work only and do not have the education or 
skills to obtain or perform the light duty work they are restricted to 
performing.  Workers’ Compensation theory considers this proof of 
disability.  North Dakota may be the lone outlier. 
C. EARNINGS CAPACITY UNDER THE VOCATIONAL  
REHABILITATION CHAPTER 
While the vocational rehabilitation provisions found in North Dakota 
Century Code chapter 65-05.1 correctly uses earnings capacity to determine 
post injury awards, there continues to be significant limitations.  North 
Dakota law generally limits total disability benefits to two years239 and 
partial disability benefits to five years.240  Although partial disability is also 
limited to just one year if vocational training was awarded.241  However, if 
the employee does not retain any earnings capacity, the partial disability 
benefit will be equal to the total disability award.242  On its face, the 
vocational rehabilitation scheme is a salutary effort to encourage return to 
work as the first option,243 but if an employee is unable to return to her 
former line of work or any other for which she is fitted, the chapter provides 
vocational retraining.244  Vocational rehabilitation is awarded only when the 
employee is unable to return to any “substantial gainful employment” 
 
239.  North Dakota law limits temporary total disability benefits to 104 weeks. N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 65-01-02(29) (2013).  This limit does not apply to permanent total disability, which is 
narrowly defined by North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(25).  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 
65-01-02(25) (2013).  
240.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (2013).  
241.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-06.1(2)(i)(4) (2013).  The court has upheld this one-year 
limit.  See Eagle v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 154, ¶ 15, 583 N.W.2d 97, 102 
(explaining that the legislative history for the reduction says “that benefits should be concentrated 
in the area of the most need, and workers who have been retrained have received rehabilitation of 
earnings as best the system can provide.”). 
242.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(6)(c) provides that if the employee 
rebuts the presumption of a retained earnings capacity, “the employee may receive partial 
disability benefits based on a retained earnings capacity of zero.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-
01(6)(c) (2013). 
243.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(3) provides that it is the “goal of 
vocational rehabilitation to return the disabled worker to substantial gainful employment with a 
minimum of retraining, as soon as possible after an injury.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) 
(2013). 
244.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(4) provides a hierarchy of priority 
options that returns the employee to substantial gainful employment (90% of the pre-injury wage).  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (2013). 
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considering the employee’s education, experience, skills, and work 
restrictions.245  Vocational rehabilitation is not available if an employee 
retains an “earnings capacity” of 90% of her pre-injury wage or the capacity 
to earn 66.67% percent of the state’s average weekly wage, whichever is 
less.246  This is referred to as the “income test.”  In the initial years after 
enactment of this chapter, a significant number of workers were 
rehabilitated through vocational rehabilitation.  However, in recent years, 
significantly fewer workers have received vocational rehabilitation 
awards.247  The reduction in vocational rehabilitation awards has been 
accomplished in two ways.  First, the Legislature has consistently lowered 
the income test.  When enacted in 1989, vocational rehabilitation was 
required if the workers did not retain the capacity to earn the lesser of their 
entire pre-injury wage, or North Dakota’s average weekly wage, whichever 
was lower.  The Legislature reduced the income test in 1991 and again in 
1995.248 
The other reason that vocational rehabilitation awards have declined is 
simply to reduce costs.  As is the case in medical causation disputes, 
vocational rehabilitation should hinge upon expert evaluation and 
testimony, but the vocational consultants WSI hires in-house are 
increasingly non-expert.  In recent years, vocational consultants have 
consistently identified low-wage, low-skilled, generic jobs as sufficient 
employment for an injured worker—in one case finding a man who lost his 
right arm did not require vocational rehabilitation because he could work 
delivering pizzas.249  Given this predilection to manufacture an earnings 
capacity based on make-work type jobs, the rehabilitation chapter could be 
aptly called a termination statute. 
 
245.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (2013).  
246.  Id. 
247.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-02.1 requires WSI’s vocational consultant 
to identify the “first appropriate rehabilitation option.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1 (2013).  
The consultant identifies a broad class of jobs she believes the employee can perform, along with 
the anticipated retained earnings capacity.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1(2)(a) (2013).  In 
most cases, WSI’s vocational consultant concludes that the employee is “employable” and retains 
a “substantial earnings capacity,” thus disqualifying the worker from vocational retraining.  
248.  1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 55 (reducing the income test to 75% of the state’s average 
weekly wage); 1995 N.D. Laws 628, § 2 (reducing the income test to 66.66% of the state’s 
average wage). 
249.  See for example Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., in which the injured worker brought suit 
against his employer, alleging an intentional tort.  1997 ND 203, 570 N.W.2d 204.  The court 
disallowed suit against the employer, holding that even gross negligence is insufficient to pierce 
employer immunity, stating the intentional tort exception requires a genuine “intent to injure.”  Id.  
¶¶ 6-22, 570 N.W.2d at 205-09.  The case is illustrative because the vast majority of cases have 
upheld WSI’s determination that the employee can return to entry level work, based upon the ipse 
dixit of WSI’s vocational consultant.  Unfortunately, employees do not have the funds to hire their 
own vocational experts to refute WSI’s consultant.  
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In many states, the odd-lot doctrine protects the employee by shifting 
the burden of proof to the compensation carrier where the medical 
restrictions and limited vocational options are such as to render it 
speculative the employee could find work.  The odd-lot doctrine recognizes 
that if an employee cannot return to any “well-known branch of the labor 
market,” the burden must be on the employer.  For an “unskilled or 
common laborer,” who “couple[s] his request for employment with notice 
that the labor must be light . . . is quickly put aside for more versatile 
competitors.  Business has little patience with the suitor for ease and favor.  
He is the odd lot man . . . . Work, if he gets it, is likely to be casual and 
intermittent.”250  North Dakota has not accepted the odd-lot doctrine, and in 
fact reverses it.  The rehabilitation statute provides that even if the 
vocational consultant concludes that none of the priority options under are 
viable, nevertheless the employee is required to “minimize the loss of 
earnings capacity, to seek, obtain, and retain employment,” and that “an 
employee is presumed to be capable of earning the . . . wages payable 
within the appropriate labor market.  This presumption is rebuttable only 
upon a finding of clear and convincing medical and vocational evidence to 
the contrary.”251 
Under this reasoning, WSI can reduce benefits to everyone who gets 
hurt, contending that injured North Dakotans should accept any trivial or 
mundane employment.  The unfairness of this system seems rather obvious; 
an injured employee with a high school education, heavy-labor work 
history, and few computer or customer service skills is surely at a 
competitive disadvantage with a younger technologically literate competitor 
for such work. 
D. EMPLOYEES ARE MANEUVERED TO  
VOCATIONAL NONCOMPLIANCE 
Although a great number of injured workers have only high school 
educations, low TABE (Test of Adult Basic Education) scores, a history of 
only heavy manual labor, and few actual transferable skills allowing them 
to compete for employment with a younger, computer-savvy, and able-
bodied work force, WSI is likely to write a vocational plan for a return to an 
occupation in the statewide job pool in generic jobs.252  WSI also writes 
 
250.  Balczewski v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor, and Human Rights, 251 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 
1977).   
251.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(6)(c) (2013). 
252.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4)(f) (2013) (providing for return to work in the 
statewide job pool “which is suited to the employee’s education, experience, and marketable 
skills.”). 
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these vocational plans even when retraining would otherwise be a higher 
vocational option, concluding—often without evidence—that the claimant 
is not a vocational rehabilitation candidate.253  An employee is obligated by 
law to conduct a good-faith work search to remain eligible for the reduced 
partial disability benefits available due to an alleged retained earnings 
capacity.254  Failure to conduct a work search results in termination.255  
Even before the vocational plan is issued, WSI is likely to have required 
employee participation in number of vocational tests and in remedial 
education.256  For example, an employee with a heavy work history, low 
grades in high school, poor TABE scores, and no ability to use a computer 
is often found to have a retained earnings capacity in the entry-level jobs of 
telephone solicitor and hotel clerk.  These jobs require computer literacy.  
Employees report that the computer training is very basic, providing no real 
skills, but competency is assured by virtue of taking the same test until one 
learns the correct answers and passes.  The employee is thereby found to 
have a retained earnings capacity in a job he really cannot do, but is 
required to continue to search for work, day after day. 
On its face, of course, the job search requirement makes eminent sense.  
Yet, in practice, practitioners have noted WSI discounts job search via 
perusal of want ads in the papers and at job service.  Rather, WSI claims 
that a good faith job search requires the employee to make five direct 
employer contacts per day, such as cold-calling.  The job search obligation 
continues throughout the lifetime of the disability claim.  After months of 
rejection, few employees are able to maintain the eager motivation to 
continue the pointless job search.  Rather than provide real vocational 
rehabilitation as North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1 was designed 
to do, WSI is able to gamble on noncompliance and win. 
 
253.  While North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(4)(g) provides for vocational 
rehabilitation, WSI frequently skips the retraining option, instead applying the catch-all 
requirement in North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(6) that requires all employees to 
continue to “minimize the loss of earnings capacity, to seek, obtain, and retain employment.”  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4)(g) (2013). 
254.  North Dakota Century Code sections 65-05.1-04(4) and (6) provide that the employee 
is responsible to make a good-faith work search. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05.1-04(4), (6) (2013).  
Under WSI’s interpretation of North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(7), an employee is 
obligated to accept even make work, as disability benefits are not payable if the employee 
voluntarily limits income or refuses to accept suitable employment.  
255.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-04(4) (2013).   
256.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(6) also requires participation in all 
vocational testing and meetings with the vocational coordinator.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-
04(6) (2013). 
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E. DISABILITY OF THE ELDERLY 
North Dakota has also reduced disability benefits available to 
employees who reach retirement age.  While North Dakota had long offset 
federal social security disability benefits,257 in 1989 it also began to offset 
federal retirement benefits.258  Additionally, an injured employee who 
receives social security retirement benefits or “attains retirement age for 
social security retirement benefits” is presumed retired and ineligible for 
disability benefits.259  If an employee is injured within two years of 
reaching the presumed retirement age, disability is limited to an additional 
two years.260  For those who continue working beyond retirement age and 
are unfortunate enough to suffer an injury at work, the Legislature has 
capped disability at three years.261  This ill-considered state policy ignores 
the fact that many working people have not saved for retirement and depend 
upon a paycheck long after they reach retirement age. 
Two states, Utah and West Virginia, have questioned whether the state 
legislature may constitutionally impose the cost of disability on the injured 
worker rather than the workers’ compensation system for those over the 
presumed retirement age.262  The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah’s 
statutory scheme to certain individuals who qualified for both social 
security retirement benefits and workers’ compensation benefits violates 
Utah’s uniform operation of the law guarantee.263  The court did not find it 
reasonable for the legislature to single out individuals for reduction of 
disability benefits based on receipt of social security retirement:  
“[p]resumably the legislature was attempting to account for the additional 
income available to social security retirement recipients.  But if income is 
the criterion, there is no rational basis to rely only on income from a single 
source.”264  The court would have concluded that the classification failed to 
pass constitutional muster for that reason alone.  Although the court noted 
potential legitimate purposes:  to prevent duplication of disability benefits; 
 
257.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.1 (2013).  
258.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.2 (2013). 
259.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09.3(1), (2) (2013).  
260.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3(4) (2013). 
261.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3(3) (2013).  
262.  Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 223 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Utah 2009).  See also State ex 
rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162, 168 (W.Va. 1996); but see Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 639 
S.E.2d 866, 873-75 (W.Va. 2006) (“Workers’ compensation has never been intended to make the 
employee whole-it excludes benefits for pain and suffering, for loss of consortium, and it provides 
a cap on wage benefits . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that our isolated statement in Boan has 
been implicitly modified by our subsequent rulings on this subject.”). 
263.  The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Utah Court of Appeals, which had upheld the 
statute.  Merrill, 223 P.3d at 1091-92.  
264.  Id. at 1094. 
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to reduce the cost of workers’ compensation for employers; and to and 
restore solvency to the fund.265  It said that reducing the employer’s cost is 
not a legitimate objective because the Workers Compensation Act “has 
already limited the liability of employers” by limiting compensation to 
injured employees to statutorily defined recoveries.266  But, the court said, 
the legislature may be legitimately concerned to prevent duplication of 
disability and to protect the fund’s solvency.267 
Ultimately, the court turned to the crux of the matter:  whether the 
legislative classification bears a reasonable relationship to these legitimate 
governmental purposes.  The court said that the purpose of workers’ 
compensation is to provide an exclusive remedy for work injuries, which 
places the burden of work injury on industry, where it belongs.268  The 
purpose of social security, on the other hand, is to guarantee pension 
income to the elderly, who had typically constituted an impoverished 
group.269  Thus, the court said, social security and disability are not 
duplicative of one another.270  Social security benefits are based upon 
having worked and contributed to the fund for the requisite number of 
quarters; disability benefits should be paid to any injured employee who 
suffers a wage loss on account of a work-related injury. 
Because the statutory schemes are not duplicative, the court said the 
classification does not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate purpose 
of avoiding duplication of benefits.271  It also held that punishing injured 
workers by reducing the degree to which they could be compensated for 
proven wage loss “is not a rational response to the legislature’s concerns 
about maintaining the solvency of the workers’ compensation fund . . . .”272  
The court agreed with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that 
assuming receipt of social security benefits fully compensates a worker for 
losses due to injury “raises a genuine issue whether the workers’ 
compensation scheme is an adequate substitute remedy.”273  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court has declined to address the issue, finding that a 
claimant failed to adequately brief her argument that the workers’ 
 
265.  Id. at 1094-95. 
266.  Id. at 1095. 
267.  Id. at 1094. 
268.  Id. at 1095. 
269.  Id. at 1096. 
270.  Id. at 1096-98. 
271.  Id. at 1098. 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id. at 1097 (quoting State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162, 168 (W.Va. 
1996)).  
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compensation statute setting forth the “retirement presumption” violated 
equal protection guarantees of federal and state constitutions.274 
F. CAUSE OF DISABILITY 
Just as an employment injury need not be the sole cause of injury, but 
only a “substantial contributing factor” to an injury,275 the same rule applies 
to disability.  The North Dakota Supreme Court has long held that the 
employee need not show the work injury is the sole or even primary cause 
of disability, but a “substantial contributing factor.”276  Brockel v. North 
Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance277 illustrates the Agency’s 
predilection to obfuscate the legal issues.  The court reversed WSI’s 
termination of Brockel’s disability benefits rendered on the theory that, 
while he continued to have work restrictions from his injury, the “primary 
disabling factor” was a non-work-related vertebral artery occlusion that 
could not be surgically corrected.278  Brockel requested a hearing, claiming 
the legal error that violated the substantial contributing factor principle.279  
At the hearing, WSI simply argued that the inability to surgically cure a 
non-work disability ended WSI’s obligations to pay disability benefits.  
WSI did not dispute that his work injury continued to carry a five-pound 
lifting restriction, which the agency had deemed disabling, paying disability 
benefits based on those work restrictions.280  Rather than decide whether the 
inability to cure the work-related disability to his shoulder justified 
termination of his disability as stated in the notice, the ALJ decided he 
lacked medical verification of disability281 and that he was not “completely 
 
274.  Weeks v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2011 ND 188, ¶ 13, 803 N.W.2d 601, 606. 
275.  Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982) (“If the 
Bureau’s position is that Satrom’s injury must not only be causally related to her employment, but 
that the employment must be the sole cause of her acute disc syndrome, we do not agree.  It is 
sufficient if the work-related stress is a ‘substantial contributing factor’ to the injury.”). 
276.  Holtz v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 479 N.W.2d 469, 471 (N.D. 1992) (citing 
Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 831).  
277.  2014 ND 26, 843 N.W.2d 15. 
278.  Id. ¶¶ 19-21, 843 N.W.2d at 23-24.  The court, noting that it had long held that a 
claimant need not prove that the work-related injury is the sole cause or even primary cause of the 
disability, but only that it be a “substantial contributing factor” to the disability, said “[c]learly, it 
is work-related injury that is at the center of the legislature’s attention.”  Id. ¶ 21, 843 N.W.2d at 
24. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. ¶ 22.  The court explained that the ALJ’s conclusion about his work injury is 
“especially troubling” because “WSI had been paying Brockel disability benefits since the 
accident” and no doctor had released Brockel to return to his former line of work, despite his 
limitations and heavy work history.  Id. 
281.  WSI’s Notice of Intent to Discontinue Disability Benefits did not advise Brockel that 
benefits were terminated lacked medical verification of disability under North Dakota Century 
Code section 65-05-08.1.  WSI had never sought a new medical verification of disability from 
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disabled,” which is not a defined term under the Act.  The decision took no 
cognizance of Brockel’s heavy work history and completely ignored the 
vocational factors that make up every disability determination.282  The case 
is illustrative of the agency’s win at all costs litigation posture, arguing a 
legal theory on appeal that it had not proffered at the hearing. 
V.  WSI’S ADVERSARIAL LITIGATION STRATEGY 
WSI’s litigation strategy relying on IMEs is in stark contrast to Satrom, 
where the court undertook rigorous review and WSI relied on the treating 
physician.  WSI’s own medical director reported in 2012 that he had been 
pressured to change his medical opinions283 and in 2014 that “the legal 
process overrides medical opinions” in the review of injured worker’s 
claims.284  WSI’s aggressive litigation posture and the poor compensation 
for claimant’s counsel have created a dearth of attorneys practicing 
workers’ compensation law.  Claimants are losing access to counsel, which 
absent systemic change in the system, will only worsen over time.  It cannot 
be contested that legal services have value; according to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, pro se claimants prevail about 19% of the time 
and represented workers about 33% of the time.285 
A. CLAIMANTS LACK ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL 
The practice of workers’ compensation law is impeded not only by an 
unnecessarily adversarial litigation strategy, but also by the fact that most 
injured workers cannot afford to retain counsel, and WSI’s compensation of 
 
Brockel as is required under the statute.  See Frohlich v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 556 
N.W.2d 297, 302 (N.D. 1996) (holding specific notice of intent to discontinue benefits for lack of 
medical verification of disability is required); see also Flink v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 
ND 11, 574 N.W.2d 784.  
282.  The court recognized that “[t]he ‘essence’ of the concept of disability under workers 
compensation law is the ‘proper balancing of the medical and the wage-loss factors.’”  Brockel, ¶ 
22, 843 N.W.2d at 24 (quoting 4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.02). As Professor Larson explains:  
The two ingredients usually occur together; but each may be found without the other.  
A claimant may be, in a medical sense, utterly shattered and ruined, but may by sheer 
determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living.  Conversely, a claimant may be 
able to work, in both the claimant’s and the doctor’s opinion, but awareness of the 
injury may lead employers to refuse employment.  These two illustrations will expose 
at once the error that results from an uncompromising preoccupation with either the 
medical or the actual wage-loss aspect of disability. 
4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.02. 
283.  Pat Springer, WSI doctor says he was pressured on claims, FARGO FORUM, Feb. 26, 
2012, http://www.inforum.com/event/article/id/352186/. 
284.  Pat Springer, North Dakota workers’ comp doctor says opinions repeatedly bypassed, 
FARGO FORUM, Mar. 16, 2014, 
http://www.prairiebizmag.com/event/article/id/18387/group/Health%20Care/.  
285.  Letter from Allen C. Hoberg to  Nancy J. Morris (Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with author).  
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attorneys is exceedingly low.  Additionally, WSI has recently announced its 
intent to increase the hourly rate from $135 per hour to $140 per hour, with 
accordingly miniscule changes to the caps on fees, which apply at every 
stage of the proceeding, from hearing to appeal.286 
Unfortunately, the court has upheld the sufficiency of whatever fee 
caps WSI wishes to set.287  However, the majority noted that the claimant’s 
attorney’s arguments “are perhaps valid criticisms of the attorney fee 
payment scheme,”288 but upheld the rule under the extremely deferential 
standard of review.  The court acknowledged that: 
The fee restrictions may discourage some attorneys from 
representing workers compensation claimants.  If that is the case, 
they have identified a problem properly the concern of the 
Legislature . . . . We offer no opinion on the wisdom of the 
legislative mandate to the Bureau, but conclude only the record of 
this rulemaking proceeding is adequate under the Act, and the 
Bureau’s promulgation of the maximum hourly rate and the fee 
caps was not an arbitrary or capricious application of its statutory 
authority.289 
Of course, WSI has the authority to change the caps to a reasonable 
level, but has simply refused to exercise it, enjoying its significant resource 
advantages.  In reply to the proposed changes to the rates and caps, 
claimants’ attorneys have noted that the new rate of $140 per hour is 
certainly not competitive in the current legal environment.  Moreover, these 
low hourly fees are entirely contingent.  While the claimants’ bar does 
dedicate a large amount of uncompensated time, no attorney can operate a 
practice representing WSI clients without charging the bulk of the fee to the 
injured worker.290  The “add-on” fee paid by WSI is almost a de-minimis 
benefit at this point.  As was argued in Little v. Traynor, the “insufficiency 
of fees paid to an employee’s attorney is evidenced by the fact that defense 
counsel are paid the same hourly rate, but on a non-contingent basis, with 
no fee caps.”291  No doubt egregious low caps on fees preclude many 
injured workers from finding legal counsel.  Moreover, North Dakota is 
 
286.  N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1 (2013).  The fee cap for all representation through 
the hearing is a paltry $5,500.00.  See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1(3)(c) (2013).  
287.  See Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, ¶ 42, 565 N.W.2d 766, 777. 
288.  Id. ¶ 24, 565 N.W.2d at 774. 
289.  Id. ¶ 6, 565 N.W.2d at 775. 
290.  In Ash v. Traynor, the court held that the attorney may obtain a fee from the client and 
bill WSI to reduce the client’s legal bill. 2000 ND 75, ¶ 11, 609 N.W.2d 96, 100.  The claimant’s 
attorney does not receive a duplicate fee, but simply shifts part of the fee to WSI.  Id. 
291.  1997 ND 128, ¶ 19, 565 N.W.2d 766, 773. 
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probably alone in forbidding use of an attorney’s lien to secure payment.292  
Just as unavailability of a mortgage would retard home ownership, the 
inability to place a lien on a recovery limits access to legal counsel. 
By contrast, WSI brings to bear enormous resources, including claims 
adjusters, investigators, legal assistants, in-house counsel, medical 
consultants, and outside counsel, against which formidable resources the 
claimant’s attorney stands alone.  While WSI pays to call its IME expert to 
testify, claimants are left to fend for themselves with no resources to call the 
claimant’s treating doctor to testify.  At one time, when commissioners 
heard these cases and the agency was represented by the attorney general, 
the treating physician was examined in the vast majority of cases.  Now, the 
playing field is completely tilted to a defense strategy, which would be fine 
if the agency was simply an insurer that appears before an independent 
commission charged with the duty to be impartial. 
The claimant, moreover, has the burden of proof.293  It is astounding 
that WSI has set fee caps so much lower than the statistics show is required 
to present an adequate case, which for the hearing is limited to just 
$5,500.00.294  According to WSI’s annual reports, the agency paid its own 
lawyers well over three times what was paid to claimant’s counsel in 2011 
and 2012.295  WSI has paid more money to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings for the cost of judges than to claimant’s counsel.296 
The question for WSI is whether injured workers should have access to 
counsel.  From 1919 until the mid-1990’s the value of legal representation 
was little questioned.  Such inadequacies indicate that WSI acts in an 
adversarial position to injured workers, and most individuals denied 
benefits absolutely need counsel.  WSI’s use of outside counsel and IMEs 
illustrates, starkly, this adversarial attitude. 
Professor Larson notes that the majority of states provide an “add-on” 
fee precisely because benefit levels are not sufficient to provide a living for 
the claimant and his or her family.  “Once legal representation of the 
claimant is recognized to be one of the given facts of present compensation 
practice, the legislative treatment of the problem—allowance of fees above 
the basic award—would seem to follow as a matter of course.”297 
 
292.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-29 (2013) (stating that except for child support obligations 
or claims by Job Service or WSI for repayment, “[a]ny assignment of a claim for compensation 
under this title is void.”). 
293.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013). 
294.  N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1(3)(c) (2013). 
295.  WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2011 AND 2012 WORKFORCE SAFETY AND 
INSURANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 35 (2012), http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/WSI_12.pdf. 
296.  Id. 
297.  8 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 133.07. 
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Crucially, Professor Larson observes that “some administrators feel 
that legal fees unnecessarily cut down the worker’s net recovery, that the 
worker would frequently do just as well without the lawyers since the board 
will always look after the workers’ interests.”298  However, North Dakota 
does not have an independent overseer, such as a commission. Rather, 
North Dakota commingles the insurance and oversight function in one 
agency.  Since WSI now uses outside counsel and IMEs to fight nearly 
every contested case, the idea that this agency “will always look after the 
workers’ interests” mocks truth and justice. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has noted that it could not have been the 
legislative intent to allow a fee on “such a low and unreasonable level as 
would foreclose a claimant from obtaining competent counsel,” for this may 
well deny due process.299  Professor Larson notes that some policy makers 
“carry restrictions on fees to the point where they may well injure claimants 
as a class both by hindering the growth of an able compensation bar and by 
making it economically impossible for claimant’s lawyers to give the 
necessary time to the preparation of each case.”300  This is the case now in 
North Dakota.  The claimants’ bar has been decimated, and the few lawyers 
who take any cases are aging. 
North Dakota policymakers, legislators, administrators, and courts 
must examine workers compensation down to its roots.  Among the 
essential questions:  does WSI think it protects injured workers so they do 
not need counsel?  What is the evidence?  Is this not belied by the 
aggressive use of IMEs rather than fairly examining the opinion of the 
treating doctor as it once did?  Does WSI believe that attorneys are 
adequately compensated?  Then why are most attorneys unwilling to 
represent injured workers?  Do attorneys serve a purpose, or is WSI 
satisfied with the eventual demise of the claimant’s bar in our state?  Should 
injured workers have access to legal services?  If rates and caps are not 
raised, how will access be assured? 
Such questions starkly answer themselves.  As to IMEs, WSI claims it 
does not use them outside of the industry standard.301  But North Dakota 
 
298.  Id. at § 133.05 (emphasis added). 
299.  Cline v. Warrenberg, 126 P.2d 1030, 1031 (Colo. 1942).  
300.  8 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 133.07. 
301.  Sedgwick, who conducted WSI’s 2014 performance evaluation, said in its report issued 
that WSI does not use IMEs more often than is the case in other states.  N.D. WORKFORCE 
SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2014 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF NORTH DAKOTA WORKFORCE 
SAFETY AND INSURANCE 29 (2014), http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/wsi_pe_14.pdf.  What 
Sedgwick misses is that while WSI may use IMEs rather rarely out of the universe of all claims 
filed, it uses them in nearly every case litigated by a claimant represented by legal counsel.  North 
Dakota has a low incidence of IMEs only because it has squeezed the life out of the claimants’ 
bar.  
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has much less litigation given the paucity of attorney representation, and 
WSI uses an IME in nearly every contested case that involves causation.  
Access to counsel simply cannot be improved without significant changes 
to reimbursement.  As the fees will remain contingent, the unfairness of the 
drastic fee caps—so that even winning cases are taken at a loss—is not 
sustainable.  The fee caps should be at least doubled.  Additionally, North 
Dakota should consider amending the statutes to provide for an attorney’s 
lien—much like the justification for creation of a purchase money security 
interest, the claimant would not be enjoying receipt of benefits without the 
legal representation. 
B. WSI RELIES ON IMES ABOVE TREATING PHYSICIANS 
WSI’s adversarial litigation posture is front-and-center in the 
proliferation of IMEs.  WSI’s use of IMEs in litigation is highlighted in the 
2014 performance audit.  The auditor said “[i]t is noteworthy that no North 
Dakota licensed physician performed any of the examinations in our claim 
review sample.”302  WSI apparently made no concerted effort to recruit 
North Dakota medical providers to conduct IME’s since 2010.303  
According to the audit of the IME process, “[s]eventy-five percent of the 
IME decisions in the evaluation group of 75 claims/80 evaluations were 
made in favor of WSI.  Only 23% of the IME decisions agreed with the 
treating physician in the North Dakota sample.”304  Remarkably, in the 
other five jurisdictions used for comparison purposes, the IME’s disagreed 
with the treating physician only 43% of the time, rather than 75% of the 
time, as in North Dakota.305 
Just the prior legislative session, two Senators with inside knowledge 
of WSI matters, Senator Kilzer and Senator Carlisle,306 introduced a bill to 
address WSI’s excessive reliance on independent medical examinations to 
deny legitimate claims.307  Section 1 of the bill was intended to strengthen 
the “treating doctor statute,”308 which at the time gave “controlling weight” 
to the opinions of the employee’s treating doctor over the opinion provided 
by a doctor in an IME.  It is self-evident that the doctor who treats his or her 
patient and sees the results of treatment is better equipped to answer 
 
302.  Id. at 9. 
303.  Id. 
304.  Id. at 24. 
305.  Id. at 24-25. 
306.  Senator Carlisle was a Commissioner at the Bureau in the early 1980s.  Senator Kilzer 
was a medical consultant at the Bureau in the 1990s. 
307.  S.B. 2298, 63d. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). 
308.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08.3 (2009).  As ultimately enacted, S.B. 2298 struck this 
language from the statute.  
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questions about the patient than a one-time IME examiner.  So it makes 
simple sense that greater weight is due the treating physician than a hired-
gun IME.309  In Albright v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance,310 
the court, relying upon legislative history rather than the actual language of 
the “treating doctor statute,” held that the purpose of the statute had simply 
been to codify existing caselaw that WSI has an obligation to consider the 
entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for 
disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant.  So long as the 
ALJ explains why the IME is more persuasive—which claimants’ attorneys 
have found can be nearly anything—the opinion of the treating doctor is 
easily disregarded. 
At one time, WSI relied on IMEs only in unique or complicated cases 
and otherwise would elect to examine the treating doctor under oath.311  In 
prior years, the Fund had a relationship with the Bismarck Assessment 
Team, which was composed of a psychiatrist, a neurologist, an orthopedist, 
and a physiatrist, to perform a joint IME.  Unlike now, there was little 
disagreement between the IME assessment team and the treating doctors. 
Once rare, IMEs are now routine for the litigator.  There is simply no 
reason to avoid listening closely to the treating doctor who knows so much 
more about the patient and injury.  A treating physician’s opinion all too 
briefly summarized in a letter can be explored in very good detail at the 
hearing. 
In the past, the opinion of the treating doctor given under oath at the 
hearing satisfied everyone, even WSI.  Many times, the complete and full-
bodied opinions of the treating doctor were nuanced to the extent that they 
actually favor WSI in substantial ways.  In order to recover this essential 
input of treating physicians that alone ensures basic fairness of opportunity 
and levels the playing field, section 2 of S.B. 2298 would have required 
 
309.  According to WSI’s 2008 Performance Evaluation Report, 82% of all of the IMEs were 
performed by Minnesota physicians and only 18% by North Dakota physicians.  2008 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 60, at 92.  It is also clear that the IME doctors 
are paid to render adverse medical opinions.  According to WSI’s 2008 Performance Evaluation, 
the IME reviewer disagreed with the treating doctor most of the time—65% in frank 
disagreement.  Id. 
310.  2013 ND 97, ¶¶ 21-27, 833 N.W.2d 1, 7-9.  The court normally resorts to legislative 
history only if the language of the statute is ambiguous. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (2013).  
The statute uses the nearly identical wording as the social security regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1527 (2012), which provides that the Social Security Administration will generally defer to 
the opinion of the treating doctor over that of the consultant.  See Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007). 
311.  For example, in Satrom v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, the court 
reversed the Bureau’s denial of benefits to a hairdresser who alleged her acute disc syndrome was 
caused by her repetitive bending, twisting, and turning of the low back based on the testimony of 
her treating physician, which the court quoted at length.  328 N.W.2d 824, 825-30 (N.D. 1982). 
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WSI to fund the cost of the taking of the claimant’s doctor’s testimony at 
hearing, but only if WSI was relying upon an IME examiner to rebut the 
claimant’s case.312  Despite the hyperbole about potential financial impact, 
this did not preclude WSI from using IMEs and calling the IME examiner 
to testify.  In fact, because the employee has the burden of proof, the IME 
would have the final rebuttal. 
The funding provision in the bill would help ensure that our state’s 
outstanding treating doctors are honored for the service they perform and 
that their professional integrity is not brought into question simply because 
they think their patient was hurt at work, requires medical care, and may 
need protective work restrictions during recovery.  The Legislature altered 
the intent of this bill by striking the funding of treating physician opinions 
from the legislation, and it ensured that the “treating physician rule” only 
requires WSI to set out its reasoning in accepting the opinion of a treating 
doctor or the WSI paid IME examiner.313 
As noted, Satrom illustrates the previous reliance on treating physicians 
to provide the expert testimony.  The North Dakota Supreme Court also 
considered WSI’s argument that “as the finder of facts, it is not required to 
adopt per se the testimony or opinion of any witness,”314 holding that 
because North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32 “requires that the 
Bureau’s findings of fact be supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” 
there is need for real judicial review whether the decision denying benefits 
is based on clear and competent medical evidence in the record.315  The 
court explained: 
The adversary concept has only limited application to claims for 
workmen’s compensation benefits and the Bureau, in carrying out 
its statutory duties, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and should be 
primarily concerned with the proper, fair, and just determination of 
any claim submitted.  Accordingly, it is inappropriate for the 
Bureau to rely only upon that part of an inconsistent medical 
 
312.  S.B. 2298, as introduced, provided in section two: “Notwithstanding section 65-05-28, 
if the organization obtains an independent medical examination or independent medical review, 
the employee may call the treating doctor to testify at the administrative hearing at the expense of 
the organization.” S.B. 2298, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (introduced version 
13.0754.01000), http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0754-
01000.pdf?20140912111749. 
313.  S.B. 2298 amended North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08.3(1) to provide that a 
“presumption may not be established in favor of any doctor’s opinion.” 2013 N.D. Laws 504, § 1.  
However, two of the seven factors identified to weigh the competing expert opinions still relate 
directly to the treating relationship.  
314.  Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 831. 
315.  Id.  
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report which is favorable to the Bureau’s position without 
attempting to clarify the inconsistency.316 
This review of the ALJ’s findings and the record does not require the 
court to re-weigh the facts or substitute its determination for that of the 
ALJ.  Rather, the court must not abdicate its review function.  Reflective 
review should recognize that the opinion of an IME or its medical 
consultant not supported by the history and evidence of record is not 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence and must be rejected in favor 
of a fully supported opinion supplied by the treating physician.  Moreover, 
unless there is clear reason to reject credibility, WSI must not attempt to 
sew up the claimant’s case with guess-work credibility determinations.317 
C. THE SAME “BUMP RULE” APPLICABLE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
SHOULD APPLY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SEEKING 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
Claimants counsel advocate adoption of a bump rule that would allow a 
demand for change of the ALJ.  While the Office of Administrative 
Hearings replied that a bump rule may reduce the diversity of the members 
deciding cases, this is no answer in administrative cases.  Unlike a 
reviewing court on appeal, the ALJ makes all fact-findings and presides 
alone.  In contrast to many other kinds of hearings over which Office of 
Administrative Proceedings presides, the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
held that workers’ compensation benefits constitute an important 
substantive right under equal protection, because such benefits are for 
personal injury and “for which the injured workers give up the right to 
sue . . . .”318  Individuals seeking worker’s compensation benefits are often 
in dire economic peril, which explains their inability to afford legal counsel.  
The critical nature of these benefits to sustain their very life-blood is strong 
argument that additional protections are necessary in workers compensation 
proceedings compared to other proceedings, such as unemployment and 
driving privilege cases.  Perhaps recognizing that the workers’ 
compensation remedy has already been adulterated to the extent the court 
has questioned whether those benefits provide the “sure and certain relief” 
required by the Act.319  The problem is compounded by the huge disparity 
in resources and an unnecessarily adversarial system. 
 
316.  Id. at 831-32 (quoting Roberts v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 326 N.W.2d 702, 
706 (N.D. 1982)).  
317.  Id. at 832 (citing Inglis v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 312 N.W.2d 318, 323 (N.D. 
1981)). 
318.  Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d 518, 519 (N.D. 1989). 
319.  Baldock v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 n.4 (N.D. 1996). 
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As previously noted, to most injured workers, the most disturbing 
aspect of administrative law is that there is no right to a trial by his peers; 
this frustration is compounded by understanding the power of the ALJ to 
alone decide her fate, with no right to demand a change of judge, as would 
be available in the district court.320  “Scholars and judges consistently 
characterize provision of a neutral decision maker as one of . . . core 
requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decision making.”321  
Regarding this most crucial factor to afford due process—an impartial 
decision-maker—North Dakota’s APA allows a party to seek 
disqualification of an ALJ if there is good cause, which is interpreted as 
showing actual bias.322 
On its surface, the procedural safeguards in the APA ensure the right to 
due process of law.  But, if the decision-maker is shown statistically more 
prone to judge cases in favor of a certain party, the procedural safeguards 
become immaterial.  Of course, the only time the injured worker has an 
opportunity to present evidence is at the administrative hearing, as the 
reviewing court does not take additional evidence or review the record de 
novo.  Instead, the courts simply review the administrative tribunal’s 
findings to determine if there is evidence in the record to support the 
findings.323  A party appealing an agency’s factual determinations will find 
that the determinations are not easily reversed, because in reviewing the 
agency’s findings of fact, the court does not make independent findings or 
substitute its judgment for the ALJs.324  The bar is a low one:  “whether a 
reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the findings were proven 
by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.”325 
 
320.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (2013) (allowing a party to demand a change of 
judge of the district court).  This right had been enshrined in North Dakota law since 1877.  See 
Traynor v. Leclerc, 1997 ND 47, ¶ 9, 561 N.W.2d 644, 648. 
321.  II PIERCE, supra note 148, at § 9.8. 
322.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-27 (2013). While North Dakota’s APA allows a party to 
challenge the ALJ for good cause, proving actual bias is a heavy burden and presents serious 
practical considerations.  Bias is typically thought to consist of:  (1) prejudgment of issues in 
controversy; (2) personal prejudice toward a party; (3) conflict of interest and ex parte 
communications; and (4) appearance of impropriety.  Personal bias or prejudice for or against a 
party will almost always require disqualification.  Personal bias, sometimes referred to as actual 
bias, is an attitude toward a person, as distinguished from an attitude about an issue.  KENNETH 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19:5, at 389-92.  A clear case of personal bias is rarely 
established, precisely because decision-makers simply do not make statements expressing either 
preference for or distaste against a party: almost no-one makes the blatant mistake of admitting 
impartiality.  Rather, personal bias can only be revealed by repeated and consistent rulings made 
by a hearing examiner in favor of one side; this should constitute grounds for disqualification.  Id. 
323.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2013). 
324.  Workforce Safety & Ins. v. Auck, 2010 ND 126, ¶ 9, 785 N.W.2d 186, 190. 
325.  Id. 
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In the midst of the explosion of cases determined in administrative 
proceedings and the tremendous deference given to agency decisions, a 
party’s due process rights to a fair and impartial tribunal loom critical.  The 
administrative code should be amended to provide for disqualification of 
ALJs on the same grounds as available to demand a change of district court 
judge.  If a duly elected district judge, whose only duty in an administrative 
case is to conduct judicial review, can be disqualified upon demand, justice 
and common sense demands that the right to disqualify an ALJ also be 
provided on demand.  After all, the rights affected in an administrative 
hearing are as significant as the rights decided in the courts. 
As noted, the APA limits the right to demand a change of ALJ to good 
cause.326  Nothing in the APA, however, limits the authority of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings to set a higher standard and allow a party an 
unfettered right to demand a change in the administrative law judge on the 
same terms as may be had in the district court.327  The 1981 Model APA 
allows disqualification of a presiding officer for the same causes for which 
a judge can be disqualified.328  Requiring proof of actual bias places too 
high a burden on the challenger. 
Initiated Measure No. 4 (approved Nov. 4, 2008), made the findings of 
an Independent Administrative Law Judge in Workforce Safety and 
Insurance matters final, subject only to appeal by WSI.329  Incorporating the 
requirements of the measure, North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-
22.1 provides that the Office of Administrative Hearings shall issue the 
final findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. Consequently, it is 
apparent that Office of Administrative Hearings has ample authority to 
promulgate a rule authorizing change of the ALJ in WSI matters on the 
same terms as demand for change of judge in the district court. 
D. IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER ALLOWING PRIVATE INSURANCE 
Clearly, reform is desperately needed.  Coverage and benefits should 
be expanded, not continually retracted.  Oddly—at least for a truly 
independent agency without its hands on the scale—WSI’s legislative 
initiatives are nearly always to reduce coverage or benefits, rarely to expand 
them. Rather than extend coverage or improve benefits, WSI has refunded 
to employers over $774 million since 2005.330  Perhaps political 
 
326.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-27(2) (2013).  
327.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (2013).  
328.  MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 4-202(c) (1981). 
329.  See Auck, ¶ 4, 785 N.W.2d at 188. 
330.  See Forum News Service, supra note 4. 
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accountability will be improved if the Legislature allows private insurance 
to compete for premium dollars and separates WSI’s regulatory and 
insurance functions.  For if WSI is simply one of the insurers, rather than 
also serving as the regulator, perhaps its influence in the Legislature will be 
reduced.  Make no mistake, WSI lobbies hard, session after session, for 
benefit and coverage limitations.  And, as noted, WSI has taken an 
aggressive litigation posture relying on IMEs and outside counsel with little 
or no institutional knowledge and the simple goal to win.  A neutral 
regulator is more likely to consider basic workers’ compensation principles 
in its lobbying, rather than relying predominantly on cost considerations. 
North Dakota is one of the few states that commingle the insurance and 
regulatory functions. 
The splitting of WSI into two entities has been needed for some time.  
Moreover, the Legislature should reinstate political accountability in the 
state’s elected officials331 by eliminating the part-time board that controlled 
WSI from 1997 until the people of our state voted to vest control of WSI in 
the Governor in 2008.332  While the Governor appoints the Director, the 
part-time board continues to determine WSI’s legislative initiatives.333  
Clearly, a full time director and staff can persuade part-time board members 
to recommend any policy they choose to advocate.334  The Governor, rather 
than this part-time board that advocates for WSI staff, should assert this 
direct control over legislative initiatives.  This is especially important in a 
state in which the lobbying insurance regulator is also the insurance 
company that pays the claims.  The very nature of an insurer is to advocate 
policies that reduce payments, or increase revenue. 
Only North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming continue to have 
a monopolist system where the state is the sole provider of workers’ 
 
331.  Perhaps the surmise that political accountability would result in a more balanced 
approach between favoring employers versus employees interests has been proven incorrect over 
time.  
332.  North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-01.3 implements the people’s approval of 
Initiated Measure No. 4, providing that the governor must appoint WSI’s director.  N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 65-01-01.3 (2013).  WSI opposed the measure.  Moreover, in December 2007, it was 
discovered that WSI had paid private investigators $774 to put Jean Wanner, the primary sponsor 
of this ballot initiative, under surveillance.  See Dale Wetzel, Leader of WSI initiative followed by 
investigators, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, Dec. 14, 2007, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/leader-of-wsi-initiative-followed-by-investigators/article_9309c5cb-861e-51fe-8bc5-
2cf8259375d2 html. 
333.  The duties of the board include providing “formal recommendations to the governor 
regarding legislation that affect the organization.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.3(5) (2013).  
334.  See generally WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE, 2013 WORKFORCE SAFETY & 
INSURANCE (WSI) LEGISLATIVE QUICK GUIDE (2013), 
http://www.workforcesafety.com/library/documents/other/LegislativeGuide2013.pdf. 
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compensation insurance.335  The current reform method of choice is toward 
privatization and open competitive markets.  In an open market 
environment, competition determines pricing. Nevada converted from a 
monopolistic state fund to allow competition in 1999.336  The 2003 
Legislature rejected a bill that would have allowed private workers’ 
compensation insurance in North Dakota.337  The bill did not address the 
need to create an oversight agency for all insurers, including the State Fund.  
Allowing other carriers to compete for business is an alluring idea; basic 
economic theory suggests that competition improves efficiency.  However, 
the renowned workers’ compensation author John Burton indicates that 
while deregulation of insurance with real competition among insurers for 
business may reduce costs, the data is not clear-cut.338  Nevertheless, 
allowing private insurance will not only provide competition, but also 
require the Legislature to vest the oversight function in a neutral regulator 
that does not also benefit from its decisions to deny payment. 
Whether or not the Legislature eventually elects to allow private 
insurance, it is time for the Legislature to untangle WSI’s insurance 
function from its oversight function and create a separate politically 
accountable state agency as regulator to oversee the insurer, WSI.  The 
benefit to be derived from this conversion is substantial justice and political 
accountability and is in conformity with recommendations of the 1972 
National Commission.339  Put it this way: who among us would be satisfied 
if the insurance company we were fighting with to receive compensation for 
an automobile accident not only wrote the policy, but also controlled the 
evidentiary hearing.  And this problem is only compounded when that 
insurer has predominance in the Legislature to advocate coverage 
exclusions and benefit limitations.  In essence, that is North Dakota’s 
workers’ compensation system as it exists now.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The workers’ compensation bargain presupposes the equality of 
employers and workers.  But employers control the workplace and have 
primary responsibility for safety.  Injured employees find that the promise 
 
335.  Help Protect Your Business and Employees with Workers Compensation Insurance, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, https://www.statefarm.com/small-
business-solutions/insurance/employee-benefits-coverage/workers-compensation. 
336.  S.B. 37, 70th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999). 
337.  H. JOURNAL, 58th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 389 (N.D. 2003). 
338.  See generally JOHN F. BURTON ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:  BENEFITS, COSTS, 
AND SAFETY UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS (2001). 
339.  Haas, supra note 18, at 272-81.   
             
2013] BROKEN PROMISE 677 
of sure and certain relief is often illusory, as coverage and benefits are 
rolled back.  Claimants have little access to legal services.  North Dakota’s 
legislative reforms and court cases have shown a clear trend to provide the 
benefits of the bargain to employers, immunizing them from suit while 
employees receive lesser coverage of injury and increasingly harder rules to 
get and keep benefits.  This has allowed employers to escape legal 
responsibility for accidents and provides a license to ignore moral 
obligations by viewing injury as inevitable.  Injured employees often 
remark that they have not only lost the ability to earn a living, but feel 
devalued by the system.  As the North Dakota Supreme Court said, the 
burden of noncoverage “still rests entirely upon the injured . . . if not 
economically, surely in the loss of dignity.”340  The Act contains high ideals 
and lofty prose, boldly declaring that “the prosperity of the state depends in 
a large measure upon the well-being of its wageworkers” and promises both 
the injured and their dependents “sure and certain relief.”341  It is time to 
restore what has been lost in the post-1995 reforms. 
The Legislature has, session after session, listened to WSI whisper that 
nothing is wrong that a bit more tightening cannot fix.  If WSI will not sign 
on to any of these concrete steps to address coverage and benefits, such as 
improving access to counsel and reducing reliance on IMEs over treating 
physicians, perhaps we have to wait for the wheels of justice to simply 
break under the strain as catalyst to action to bring the Act back into 
balance.  If that occurs, the demand will be to allow free market principles 
to operate and permit other insurance companies to write policies with 
creation of an independent entity to perform the oversight function.  The 
status quo is not working, and the eyes of the nation are upon us. 
 
 
340.  Benson v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D. 1979). 
341.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013).  The Act, adopted in 1919, “exhibited a socialist 
bent,” as progressives also created the State Mill and Elevator and State Bank.  See Anderson and 
Deloss, supra note 38, at 352. 
